Show Me the Money: Using the Business Case Rationale to Justify Gender Targets in the EU by Lee, Fawn
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 36, Issue 5 2013 Article 7
Show Me the Money: Using the Business Case
Rationale to Justify Gender Targets in the EU
Fawn Lee∗
∗Fordham University School of Law
Copyright c©2013 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
NOTES
SHOW ME THE MONEY:
USING THE BUSINESS CASE RATIONALE TO
JUSTIFY GENDER TARGETS IN THE EU
Fawn Lee*
INTRODUCTION 1472
I. GENDER DIVERSIIY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 1475
A. Legal Principles of Passing Gender Equality
Legislation 1475
1. Equal Treatment of Gender in EU Law 1475
2. Subsidiarity and Proportionality 1478
B. Rationale For Diversity On Corporate Boards 1480
1. The Business Case Rationale 1481
2. Critiques of the Business Case Rationale 1483
C. European Countries that Have Implemented a
Gender Quota 1487
1. Norway 1486
a. Board Composition 1489
b. Norwegian Corporate Performance and
Policies After the Passage of the Quota 1490
2. Spain 1492
3. France 1493
II. IMPLEMENTING AN EU-WIDE GENDER
LEGISLATION 1494
A. Arguments For A Uniform Law For Gender
Diversity On Corporate Boards in the European
Union 1494
J.D. Candidate 2014, Fordhan University School of Law. The author would like
to thank her family for their continuing support. The author would also like to thank
Professor Martin Gelter for his invaluable advice and guidance. Finally. the author
would like to thank the Fordhan International Law journal for the opportunity to
publish this Note.
1471
1472 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 36:1471
1. The Requirements Under the Binding Directive 1494
2. Reasoning Behind a Binding Objective 1496
3. Legality of Passing the Directive 1500
a. Subsidiarity 1500
b. Proportionality 1501
B. Arguments Against the Binding Objective 1504
III. THE EUROPEAN UNION PROPOSED DIRECTIVE IS
LEGAL, BUT NOT SUFFICIENT 1508
A. Is the Directive Legal? 1508
B. The Directive Is Not Enough to Promote Diversity 1513
CONCLUSION 1515
INTRODUCTION
On February 22, 2002, Ansgar Gabrielsen, Norway's
Minister of Trade and Industry shocked the country when he
announced that the government was imposing a forty percent
quota for female boards of directors.' This announcement was
even more controversial because it was a surprise to the other
members of the Norwegian government.2 Norway became the
first country to implement a mandatory quota for females on
corporate boards.
Similarly, on September 3, 2012, Viviane Reding, the Justice
Minister of the Commission for the European Union,
announced that she would propose a directive forcing all listed
L See The Business oJ Gender Equality, NORWAY.ORG (Feb. 22, 2002),
http://wwy.no-nvay.org/AR(HITE/News/archive/2001/200105gendier (announcing
the Norwcgian board quota): Nicola Clark. The Female Factor: Getting Women Into
Boardroons by Law, N. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2010, http://www.tntimes. om/2010/01/28/
world/ curope/28iht-quota.htmi (reporting on the impleinentation of Nornegian
gender quota).
2. See Hledvig Bugge Reiersen & Beate Sjafjell, Report frm Nonvay: Gender Equality
in the Board Room I (Eur. Company L., Working Paper No. 4, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1139604 (reflecting on impact of quota in Norway); see also
Clark, supra note I (giving a description of the introduction of the Norwegian gender
quota).
3. See Janics Kanter, European Proposal Presses for Women to Join Boards. N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 4, 2012, at B2 (giving background Norway's gender quota); janes Fontanella-
Khan, EU Pushes 40% Quota for Women on Boards, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2012)
ItLLp: //wwy.ft.co/intl /cis/s/0/65f494c6-5c7-11 cI -a6c2-00144feabdc.htmil
(relaying information about Norway's gender quota).
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companies in the European Union ("EU") to implement a forty
percent gender quota on their boards.4 Currently, women only
make up 13 .7 % of board seats in the largest publicly listed
companies in the European Union. Reding, frustrated with the
slow progress of gender diversity on corporate boards,
introduced the proposal after other attempts to increase
diversity failed.@
Reding faces opposition from several Member States, her
fellow Commissioners, and even some women's equality groups. 7
On September 14, 2012, a week after Reding's announcement,
nine Member States-Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom-wrote a letter to Reding and the President of
the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, stating their
opposition to the proposed quota.8 The letter expressed that
4. See supra note 3 (reporting on the announcement of the proposed quota).
5. See James Kanter, Renwed Push in Europe To Seat Women on Boards. N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 2012, at B3 ("Only 13.7 percent of corporate seats in the largest public
companies in the European Union are held by women, according to the
commission."); Progress Report of the justice Committee on Women in Economic Decision
MWaking in the EU at 9 (2012), available at http://ec.europa.cu/ justice/gender-equality/
files/ o men-on-boardsen. pdf [hereinafter Commission Progress Report]
(summarizing the status of gender diversity on boards in the EU); European
Commission, Database on Women and Aen in Decision Aaking http://ec.europa.cu/
justice/gender-equality/gender-decision-making/database/business-Hinance /financial-
institutions/index en.hti [hereinafter European Commission Database] (compiling
data about gender diversity in the EU).
6. See Fontanella-Khan, supra note 3; Kanter, supra note 3 (giving the reasoning of
the proposed quota).
7. See Ivan Camileri, Women EU Commissioners Block Gender Quota Plan,
TIMEsOrMALTA.COM (Oct. 24, 2012), http:w//wyw.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/
20121024/ ocal/'Woien-EU-commissioners-block-gender-quotas-plan.442358
(reporting on the delay in proposing gender quotas); Ophelic Spanneut, College of
Commissioners Blocks Quotas for Vomen, EU' ROPOL.ITICS, Oct. 24, 2012,
http://www.curopolitics.info/social/college-of-commhtfissioners-blocks-quotas-for-
women-artS44384-25.htmi (reporting the postponemint of proposal for EU gender
quotas); see also Juliet Mann, Wore Women Needed In "Identikit Boardrooms," Says CEO,
CNN (Feb. 9 2012), http://cdition.cnn.coi/2012/02/09/business/women-in-the-
boardroom /index.htin (quoting head of 30%, a group that promotes gender equality
on corporate boards); The Women ofEurope Should Be Outraged, NEW EUR. ONLINE (Oct.
28, 2012. 9:53 PM), http://www.neurope.cu /artick/wolien-europe-should-be-
outraged (expressing criticism of quota proposal).
8. See Letter from Totyu Mladenov, Minister of Labour and Soc. Policy, Bulgaria,
et al. to Jose Manuel Barroso, President, European Commission & Viviane Reding,
Vice-Presideit, European Commission (Sept. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Letter of
Opposition], (published by the Financial Times) available at http:,// wy.ft.com/intl/
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while there are too few women on the boards of companies, the
goal of gender diversity is "first and foremost up to the Member
States to find their own national approaches."'
On November 14, 2012, the Commission proposed a new
directive.' The new proposal softened the quota, mandating
instead that companies implement policies to reach a forty
percent objective by 2020.11 It requires listed companies that are
"public undertakings" to meet this objective by 2018.12 The
proposed directive excludes small and medium size enterprises
("SMEs"), but would affect approximately 5,000 corporations in
the European Union.3 If the European Union adopts this
proposal, the law could impact the way corporations structure
their boards, their corporate status (i.e., whether the company
remains private or public), and the positions of women
throughout the company.'4
This Note analyzes the Commission's rationale for initiating
this proposed directive and whether it satisfies the principles of
cms/28b56d12-00d7-11c2-8197-00144feabdcO.pdf (arguing against proposal for
binding quotas for women on corporate boards).
9. Id. (opposing the gender quota).
10. See Commission Press Relcase, IP/12/1205 (Nov. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Nov.
14 press Release] (publicizing the Commission's proposal for the 40% objective of
women on the board); Aoife White, EU Companies Face 40% Quota Rule Favoring Women
on Boards, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 14. 2012, http://ww.blooiberg.com/ncws/2012-11-
14/ eu -companies-face-40-quota-rule-favoring\-women-on-boards-2-.html (reporting on
the Comminssion's proposal).
11. James Fontanella-Khan, Brussels Waters Down Board Quota Plans, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms0/s/0/f562b3a-2d6f-l 1e2-9b88-
00l44fcabdc.htinl (reporting on the forthcoming announcement of the proposed
dirctlive and noting the rescinding of the quota); White, supra note 10 (announcing
the amendment of the proposed directive in November 2012).
12. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Improving the Gender Balance Among Non-cxccutivc Directors of
Companies Listed on Stock Exchanges and Related Measures, COM (2012) 614 final,
art. 4(1) (Nov. 2012) [hereinafter Proposed Directive] (proposing a binding gender
objective on select EU corporate boards).
13. See Nov. 14 Press Release, supra note 10 (approximating the number of
companies that would be affected by the proposal); James Kanter, Britain Opposes
Quotas for Women on Boards, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2012, at B9 (reporting on
Commission's announcement of proposed directive). Small and medium size
enterprises ("SMEs") are defined as companies that have fewer than 250 persons and
that have an annual turnovcr of EU50 million or a balance sheet EU C43 million or
less, or the monetary equivalent of that, if the Member State does not use the euro. See
Proposed Diictive, supra note 12, at art. 2 (defining "SME's").
14. See generall infra Part ILB (describing the arguimcnis in opposition to the
proposed directive, as well as general concerns regarding gender equality legislation).
GENDER TARGETS IN THE EU
subsidiarity and proportionality, two elements that must be met
for EU legislation to pass. Part I of this Note discusses the legal
principles and rationales applicable to gender equality in the
European Union. Part I also discusses the countries that have
already adopted binding gender equality laws. Next, Part II of
this Note describes the arguments for and against the
implementation of Reding's proposal of a gender equality
objective, focusing on the principles of subsidiary and
proportionality. Part 11 then examines the arguments that
Member States have made in opposition to the proposed
objective and gender equality legislation in general. Finally, Part
III analyzes the arguments presented in Part II and questions
the arguments for the gender objective. Part III recommends
that the European Union implement policies and create
programs that prevent women from leaving the workplace
before they reach management levels, such as providing better
daycare and work hours.
I. GENDER DIVERSITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Gender diversity is an important issue in the European
Union, as seen in EU treaties, EU case law, and individual
countries' legislation. To aid in the determination of whether
the Council and Parliament may properly pass the proposed
directive, this Part discusses the background of diversity and its
presence in the European Union. Part L.A describes the legally
binding effect of an EU directive and the legal principles
invoked in passing a law regulating gender equality. Part I.B
discusses the business case rationale, which is used to justify
diversity on corporate boards. Part I.C describes the
implementation of a gender quota in Norway, one of the
inspirations for the proposed directive, and countries in the
European Union that have implemented quotas.
A. Legal Principles of Passing Gender Equality Legislation
Several EU treaties contain provisions for gender equality
in the workplacei 5 Additionally, the Court of Justice of the
15. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European
Union arts. 8, 153(1) (i), 157(4), 2012 O.J. C 326/47, at 53, 115, 118 [hereinafter
TFEU] (stating in the Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the
2013] 147'
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European Union ("the Court of Justice") decided several cases
that set the precedent for the permissibility of legislation for
gender equality.16 The proposed directive must also satisfy
several other principles of law. Under the principle of
subsidiarity, the Treaty on European Union ("TEU") limits EU
action to areas that cannot be achieved at a national level.' 7
Under the principle of proportionality, proposed legislation can
only regulate activities to the degree necessary to achieve its
objectivei 8
1. Equal Treatment of Gender in EU Law
The Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union
("TFEU) contains several provisions mandating gender
equality.' Article 8 of the TFEU states that " [i] n all its activities,
the Union shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote
equality between men and women."2" Article 2 of the Treaty of
the European Union ("TEU post-Lisbon") lists equality as one
of the values the European Union is founded on, specifically
referring to equality between men and women.2 Furthermore,
Article 3 of the "TEU post-Lisbon "states that the European
European Union ("TFEU") powers of EU institutions and rights of EU citizens);
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union arts. 2, 3(3), 2012 O.J. C
326/13. at 17 [hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon] (establishing powers in the Consolidated
Version of the Treaty on European Union ("TEU") of EU institutions and rights of its
Citizens).
16. See generally Gcorg Badeck and Others, Case C-158/97, [2000] E.C.R. 1-1902;
Katarina Abrahamsson & Leif Anderson v. Elisabet Fogelqvist, Case C-407/98, [2000]
E.C.R. I-5539 (deciding whether national laws may give priority to womnen as an
underreprescntcd class in a public sector); Hcllinut Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen, Case C-409/95, [1997] E.C.R. I-6363 (deciding whether a national rule may
give priority in employment opportunities to equally qualified women if they are
underreprescntcd).
17. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 15, art. 5(3), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 18 (stating the
requirement of subsidiarity and proportionality).
18. Id. art. 5(4), at 18 (explaining briefly the requirecLnts under
proportionality).
19. See TFEU, supra note 15. arts. 8, 153(1)(i). 157(4). 2012 O.J. C 326, at 53. 115.
118 (mandating equality of gender).
20. See TFEU, supra note 15, art. 8, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 53 (requiring the EU to
protect equality).
21. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 15. art. 2. 2012 O.J. C 326, at 17 (listing the
basic values the EU treaties).
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Union "shall promote . . . equality between women and
men."2 2
In addition to the treaties, the Charter of Fundamental
Human Rights of the European Union ("Charter of Rights")
also protects gender equality in the workplace2 Article 21 of the
Charter of Rights provides that there may be no discrimination
based on the grounds of sex.24 Article 23 ensures equality
between men and women in "employment, work and pay."25
More importantly, Article 23 also expressly states that "[t]he
principle of equality shall not prevent the maintenance or
adoption of measures providing for specific advantages in favour
of the under-represented sex."26
These treaties establish that the European Union may take
positive action to ensure the fundamental right of gender
equality.27 The TFEU authorizes the European Parliament
("Parliament") and Council to "adopt measures to ensure the
application of the principle of equal opportunities and equal
treatment of men and women in matters of employment and
occupation including the principle of equal pay for equal work
or work of equal value."T The treaties and the Charter of Rights
show that gender equality a fundamental right in the European
Union and that EU institutions may pass legislation to enforce
that right and aid the underrepresented sex.29
22. Id. art. 3(3), at 17 (expressing the requirement of equality between men and
women).
23. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 21(1), 23, 2012
O.J. C 326/391. at 396 [hereinafter Charter of Rights] (protecting in the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union ("Charter of Rights") equality as a right in
the workplace).
24. Id. art. 21 (1), at 396 (protecting against sex discrimination).
25. Id. art. 23, at 400 (protecting against discrimination against gender in the
workplace).
26. Id. (showing that the Charter of Rights explicitly provides there may be action
in favor of the underrepresented sex which would not violate Article 21's principle of
equality).
27. TFEU, supra note 15, art. 157(3), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 118 (giving the EU the
power to take positive action).
28. Id. (giving the Parliament and Council the power to pass protective
legislation).
29. See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text (discussing the trcaics'
provisions and Charter of Rights that mandate gender equality).
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The Court of Justice laid down necessary elements that
must be met before positive action may be used.so First, the
measures must concern a sector in which women are under-
represented.3' Next, the measures must not "automatically and
unconditionally give priority to women when women and men
are equally qualified. . . ."3 2 Finally, the candidates must be
subject to an "objective assessment, which takes [into] account
the specific personal situations of all candidates." The Court
also held in Abrahamsson v. Fogelqvist that in applying these
criteria the procedures must be transparent and amenable to
review to obviate any arbitrary assessment of the qualifications of
candidates.34 Once it is established that the European Union
may take positive action, it must be ensured that that action
fulfills the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 5
2. Subsidiarity and Proportionality
Directives are one of four types of legislation that the
European Union may pass.36 Directives "shall be binding, as to
the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is
addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice
of form and methods."37 In addition, Member States have some
30. See Georg Badeck and Others, Case C-158/97. [2000] E.C.R. I-191. 13
(holding that wvonen are given priority in public sectors where they are under-
represented under certain conditions).
31. See id. (holding that a national law that gives priority to women in a public
under-represented sector is compatible wvith EU law).
32. See id. (holding that a law giving priority to women cannot give a female
candidate automatic preference).
33. See id. (requiring a national law that gives preference to the under-represented
sex be objectively assessed): see generally Marschall v. NordrIhcin-Westalen. Case C-
409/95. [1997] E.C.R. I-6364, Sunmary of Judgnent 1 1. The Court held in Kalanke v.
Freie Hansestadt Bremen that national law cannot automatically give preference to
women over equally or even more qualified men. Kalanke v. Freic Hanscstadt Bremen
Case C-450/93, [1995] E.C.R. I-3078. 1 24.
34. Katarina Abrahansson & Leil Anderson v. Elisabet Fogelqvist, Case C-407/98,
[2000] E.C.R. I-5582, 1 49 (deciding whether national laws may give pioit to women
as an underreprescnted class in a public sector).
35. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 15, art. 5(3), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 18 (stating that
when exercising EU powers the action is limitcd by the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality).
36. TFEU, supra note 21, art. 288, 2010 0.J. C 83, at 171-72 (establishing the
forinm of EU legislation). The EU's governing bodies may also issue regulations,
decisions, and recommendations and opinions. Id.
37. Id. (describing what an EU-issued directive is).
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freedom in the means by which the directive is implemented
and regulated. "
The TEU post-Lisbon mandates that the European Union's
power to legislate is limited by the principle of subsidiarity."
Article 5(3) of the TEU post-Lisbon dictates that for the areas
that do not fall within the explicit control of the Union power,
the European Union may act only if the goal of the proposed
action cannot be effectively enacted by the Member States.
Additionally, the objective must be better achieved by taking EU-
wide action, because of either the scale of the legislation or
further reaching effects.4 '
Protocol (No 2) of the TEU post-Lisbon and the TFEU state
that the Commission shall consult widely and take into account
the regional and local dimension of the action. 42 Protocol (No
2) also states that proposed legislation should be substantiated
by qualitative and, if possible, quantitative indicators and take
into account the financial or administrative burden on national
governments, regional or local authorities, and economic
operators and citizens.43 Thus, the proposed directive must show
that the objective of gender diversity cannot be achieved
individually by the Member States.44
Article 5 of the TEU post-Lisbon also mandates that Union
power conforms to the principle of proportionalitV.
Additionally, the content and the form of Union action cannot
exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the
Treaties.4 6 Protocol No. 2 of the TEU post-Lisbon requires the
Commission to contain some assessment of the proposal's
38. Id. (establishing the elements of an EU directive).
39. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 15, art. 5(3), 2010 OJ. C 83, at 18 (establishing
the principle of subsidiarity).
40. Id. (describing the clenents that must be fulfilled under subsidiarity).
41. Id. (establishing the requircments for subsidiarity).
42. Protocol (No 2) of the TEU post-Lisbon and the TFEU art. 2, 2010 0.J. C
83/206, at 206 (issuing protocols for following principle of subsidiarity pursuant to EU
treatics).
43. Id. art 5, at 207 (stating an action that the EU must undertake to fulfill
subsidiarity).
44. See supa notes 39-43 (discussing the requirements under subsidiarity that all
directives, including the gender directive, must pass under).
45. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 15, art 5(4), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 18 (requiring
proportionality for proper legislation).
46. Id. (specifying wvhat is necessary to meet the proportionality requirement).
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financial impact and its implications for the rules to be put in
place by the Member States when proposing a directive 4
Any EU directive must meet three elements to satisfy
proportionality: 1) the proposal must be reasonably and
rationally related to a legitimate goal, 2) its costs must not be
excessive in light of its benefits, and 3) it must represent the
least restrictive action available and avoid unnecessary incidental
constraints.48 The Court of Justice, however, gives the legislature
wide discretion to make social policy choices that requires it to
carry out complex assessments.4 Accordingly, the proposed
directive must be geared towards a legitimate goal, its cost must
not outweigh its benefits, and it must be the least restrictive
option.5o
B. Rationale For Diversity On Corporate Boards
Historically, diversity has been promoted for social reasons,
but in recent years, diversity advocates have shifted to the
"business case rationale," arguing that diversity in corporations
improves corporate performance.51 Advocating that diversity is
beneficial for business allows supporters to avoid arguing for
diversity based on remedying past discrimination.52 The next
47. Protocol (No 2) of the TEU post-Lisbon and the TFEU, supra note 42, art. 5,
2010 0.). C 83, at 207 (specifying means of fulfilling proportionality).
48. See generally Internationale Handclsgescllschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-Und
Vorratsstelle Fur Getreide Und Futterimittel. Case 11/70 1970 E.C.R. 01125 (holding
that legislation cannot run counter to fundamental rights of the European Union). Id.
at 1 16 (holding that there must be a balancing test); United Kingdom of Great Britain
& Northern Ireland v. Council of the European Union, Case C-84/94. [1996] E.C.R. I-
05755, [ 81 (holding that EU legislation may not be overly restrictive).
49. See The Queen v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food & Secretary of
State for Health, ex partc: Fcdcsa and others, Case C-331/88, [1990] E.C.R. I-04023
(qualifying how proportionality is to be judged in court).
50. See supra notes 45-49 (detailing the requirements of proportionality that all
directives must pass under).
5 1. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New Rationale, Sane Old Story? , 89
N.C. L. REV. 855, 856-57 (2011) [hereinafter Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited]
(evaluating effectiveness of using business case rationale to improve corporate
diversity); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis oj the
Business Rationales For DiversitY On Corporate Boards, 2005 WiS. L. RL. 795, 838-40
(2005) [hereinafter Fairfax, The Bottom Line] (discussing the evolution of the rationales
for promoting diversity on corporate boards).
52. SeeTristin K. Green, Race and Sex in Organizing ork: "Diverity, Discrimination,
and Integration, 59 EM~ORY L.J. 585. 595 (2010) (Stating that busincss case model
developed in response to opposition to affirmative action); I)avid B. Wilkins, From
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section describes the business case rationale and the critiques
against its use to justify diversity in the board.
1. The Business Case Rationale
The business case rationale states that corporate board
diversity leads to economic benefits for corporations.53 Empirical
evidence suggests that board diversity leads to economic benefits
such as an increase in firm value, improved corporate
governance, an increase in the return on equity, and a higher
return on invested capital.54 A 2007 study by McKinsey and
Company showed that the eighty-nine most diverse European
listed companies outperformed other companies relative to the
average for their sector." The study showed that these
companies had an 11.4% return on equity compared to the
average of 10.3%, earnings of 11.1% compared to the average
5.8%, and stock growth from the period of 2005-2007 of 64%
compared to the average 47%.56
"Spaate is Inhertly U nqual" to "Diversity is Good Jor Business": The Rise ojMarket-Based
Diverity Argumnent and the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1554
(2004) (describing the aversion to justifying diversity based on past discrimination by
the Supreme Court and most of the country until Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003)).
53. See Fairfax, , Board Diversity Revisited, supra note 51, at 857: Steven A. Ramirez,
Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STAN. J.. BU S. & FIN. 85, 85-86 (2000) (describing the
trend of corporate America moving towards diversity in the workforce to enhance
productivity and competitiveness).
54. See Commission Progress Report, supra note 5, at 7 (add parenthetical);
Catalyst, THE BOTTOM LINE: CORPORATE PERFORMANCE AND WOMEN'S
REPRESENTATION ON BOARDS, (2007), available at http://wwW.catalyst.org/knowledge/
bottom-line-corporate-performance-anid-worens-representation-boards (reporting
beneficial effects of having women on boards).
55. Diversity was evaluated by looking at the number and proportion of women on
the executive committee, their iunction (i.e. Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") or Chief
Financial Officer ("CFO")), number of women on the board, and statistics on gender
diversity in the annual report. MCKINSLY & COMPANY. WXOMEN MATTER: GENDER
DIVERSITY, A CORPORATE PERFORMANCE )RIVR 13-14 (2007) (reporting on benefits of
diversity on corporate boards using corporate performance). McKinsey & Company is a
global management -consulting firm. See id. Companies were chosen from listed
companies wvith a stock market capitalization over EUC150 million. Id. at 13 (reporting
on benefits of diversity on corporate boards using corporate performance).
56. Id. at 14. Additionally, a 2007 study in Finland found that companies that had
a female CEO were 1.8% more profitable than companies that had a male CEO based
on return on assets. return on investments, and the operating margin. ANNA
KOTIRANTA ET AL., FEMALE LEADERSHIP AND FIRi PROFITABILITY 3 (2007) (sampling all
of the limited liability companies employing at least 10 people in Finland).
2013] 1481
1482 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:1471
Proponents argue that gender diversity on boards leads to
higher corporate performance for several reasons.5 The first,
most common rationale is that diversity leads to innovation, a
greater variety of ideas, and the avoidance of "group think ."58 In
addition, companies can enlarge their talent pool and attract
the best candidates by appealing to more women.59 Accordingly,
diversity gives the board a greater perspective and creates a
more qualified board.co
Studies also show that there must be a certain proportion of
women on a board to have an impact on corporate
performance.' This "critical mass" theory asserts that when
there is a more balanced group of women on the board, the
company will start to experience the performance benefits of
having a diverse board.62 Studies show that three is the "magic
number" of women needed on the board to effect positive firm
performance.6 The studies conclude that having more women
57. See CREDIT SUISSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, GENDER DIVERSITY AN) CORPORATE
PLRFORNCME 17-20 (2012) (reporting on effects of board diversity and corporate
performance); DAVID A. CARTER ET AL., THE DIVERSITY OF CORPORATE BOARD
COMMITTEES AN) FIRM FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 10-11 (2007) [hereinafter CARTER,
DIVERSITY OF CORPORATE BOARD COMMITTEES] (studying effects of diversity and
corporate performance).
58. See CREDIT SUTSSE, supra note 57, at 18 (finding that more diverse groups
perform better than homogenous groups). See also CARTER. DIVERSITY OF CORPORATE
BOARD COMMITTEES; supra note 57, at 10 (stating that diversity is beneficial because it
leads to shifts in perspective, creativity, and innovation).
59. See CREDIT SUISSE, supra note 57, at 18 (concluding that because females inake
up a greater proportion of graduates and greater percentage of girls get top grades,
companies with the greatest amount of diversity are more likely to "tap into the widest
possible pool of talent"). See also FORBES INSIGHT, GLOBAL DIVLRSITY AND INCLUSION:
FOSTERING INNOVATION THROUGH A DIVERSE WORKFORCE 7-9, 19 (2011) (advocating
diversity on corporate boards using corporate performance as an incentive).
60. See infra notes 70-72 (discussing the reasons that diversity increases corporate
performance).
61. See Jasmrine Joccks et al., Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm Peformance:
What Exactly Constitutes a "Critical MWass'?, J. Bus. ETHICS 17-18 (2012) (examining the
requirements for critical mass); Mariateresa Torchia et al., Women Directors on Copporate
Boards: From Tokenism to CrticalMass 102J. BU S. ETHICS 299, 312-13 (2011) (studying
how to achieve effct(s of gender diversity on boards).
62. See Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Some Effects of Proportions oj Group Life: Skewed Sex
Ratios and Responses to Token Women. 82 AM.J. SOC. 965, 966 (examining the number of
women required to effect change on a corporate board); Joccks, supra note 61. at 6
(finding the critical mass for women on boards).
63. See Joccks, supra note 61. at 17 (concluding that critical mass is reached with
three women on the board); Torchia, supra note 61, at 302 (finding that critical mass is
reached when there are at least three wormen on the board).
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on the board increases their visibility, decreases polarity between
the women and the others board members, and decreases the
likelihood of assimilation, where other board members distort
the views of a single woman to fit the pre-existing generalizations
of women.64. Merely having a woman on the board is not
enough to increase firm performance; there must be a certain
number of women on the board before these benefits can be
obtained.6
Corporations and regulatory agencies have embraced the
business case rationale.66 The US Securities and Exchange
Commission, for example, requires that corporations disclose
whether it considers diversity when choosing directors.
Additionally, in 2011, the EU Commission used the business
case rationale when issuing a recommendation aimed at
increasing the percentage of women on corporate boards.68
2. Critiques of the Business Case Rationale
Although the business case rationale is popular, critics
attack the theory's effectiveness in achieving diversity.G They
argue that the studies that show that /*greater diversity
64. See gen eally Kanter, supra note 62; see Torchia, supra note 61, at 301-04
(finding that when there is only one woman on a board she will be stereotyped and
ignored by the majority group.
65. See supra notes 61-64 (discussing the critical mass theory).
66. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited. supra note 51, at 865 (describing the
increasing reliance on economic justiications for diversity); Wilkins, supra note 52, at
1555 (claiming that diversity advocates stake their claim on marketplace reasoning).
67. Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 22 9 .4 0 7 (c) (2) (vi) (2010);
Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334 (Dec. 23, 2009) (requiring
disclosure of diversity policies in corporations). See Fairfax, Board Diversit Revisited,
supra note 51, at 865-66 (using the SEC's regulation as an examplc of the increased
acceptance of the business case rationale).
68. Commission Memorandum, EU Justice Commissioner Reding challenges
business lcaders to increase woncns presence on corporate boards with "Women on
the Board Pledge for Europe," Memo/ 11/124 (Mar. 1, 2011), available at
http://curopa.cu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO-11-124_cn.htm [hereinafter
Commission Memorandum] (challenging EU corporations to sign a pledge to increase
diversity on their corporate boards).
69 See generally Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited. supra note 51 (giving a critique of
the use of the business case rationale to justify diversity on boards); Coln McLaughlin
& Simon Deakin, Equaibty Law and the Limits of the "Buiness Case"for A ddressing Gender
Inequalities, in GLNDERLD LIVES: GENDER INLOUALITILS IN PRODUCTION AND
RLPRODUCTION 153, 158 (Jacqueline Scott e al. eds., 2011) (addressing the limitations
of using business case rationale for gender equality).
1484 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 36:1471
improves corporate performance only prove correlation, not
causation.70 This weakens the argument for the business case
rationale because the improved corporate performance could
be attributed to factors other than diversity.7'
Furthermore, a study by David A. Carter, Frank D. Souza,
Betty J. Simkins, and W. Gary Simpson ("CSSS study") that
attempted to prove causation concluded that there was no
causation between diversity and corporate performance.72 The
CSSS study used Tobin's q, a measure of corporate performance,
to measure financial performance of a company and tested it
against the business case model.7 The CSSS study concluded
that under none of the theories was there enough statistically
significant evidence to show causation between diversity and
Tobin's q.74
Additionally, several studies conclude that in reality, firms
that improved diversity had no change at all, or actually suffered
from a decrease in corporate performance.75 A study of the 500
70. See Fairfax, Board Diversit Revisited, upra note 51, at 862-63 (attacking studies
that find diversity increases firm performance because causation cannot be
established). See also Lissa Lainkin Broome & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Signaling Through
Board Diversity, 77 U. CIN. L. RLV. 431. 433-34 (2008) (discussing gaps that empirical
evidence of business case theory leaves); CARTER, DIVERSITY OF CORPORATE BOARD
COMMITTEES, supra note 57, at 5 (identifying the problem of empirical investigation for
business case rationale).
71. See Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited, supra note 51, at 862-63 (attacking studies
that find diversity increases firn performance because causation cannot be
established). See also Broome, supra note 70, at 433-34 (listing alternative possibilities
for improvement of corporate performance).
72. See David A. Carter ct al., The Gender and Ethnic Diversity of US Boards and Board
Committees and Financial Peiformance, 18 CORP. GOVLRNANCL 396, 411 (2010)
[hereinafter Carter Gender and Ethnic Diversity] (concluding that when using Tobin's
q as a ilcasure of financial performance there is no causal relationship, positive or
negative, between gender diversity). See also Fairfax, Board Diversit Revisited, supra note
51, at 862-63 (pointing out weak points of the business case rationale even
acknowledged and studied by business case advocatCs).
73. Carter. Gender and Ethnic Diversity, supra note 72, at 402, 411 (defining which
calculation of Tobin's q was being used and the four theories of business case rationale
being tested).
74. Id. at 411 (finding no significant results of causation). The researchers found
that the resource dependence theory and human capital theory offer the most support
for positive causation between gender and ethnic diversity and firm performance, but
was unable to conclude that there was causation because the other theories were not
mutually exclusive. Id.
75. See Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited, supra note 51, at 862-63 (attacking the
studies that show diversity has a positive effect on corporate performance); see also
Renee 1. Adarns & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their Impac on
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largest companies in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden found no
significant impact on stock performance or returns on assets.76
One US study concluded that, while female directors have a
positive effect on corporate governance, they have a negative
impact on firm performance.7
A study conducted by Frank Dobbins and jiwook Jung, of
the Harvard Sociology Department, studied the effects of
gender diversity and the institutional investor community
influences.78 The study found that increasing board diversity did
not affect profits, but negatively affected stock prices.70 Dobbins
and Jung attribute this to their "bias theory," which hypothesizes
that increases in board diversity activates the gender bias of
institutional investors.so
This bias theory hypothesizes that institutional investors
subsequently decrease their holdings in that company as a result
of gender bias.8' However, the study shows that visible investors
significantly increase their positions after increased gender
diversity.8 2 Dobbins and Jung attribute this finding to their
accountability hypothesis, which posits that because visible
Gov ernac and Pfor mance, J. FIN. ECON. 291, 292-93 (studying the impact of females
on corporate boards and corporate performance); Frank Dobbins & Jiwook Jung,
Corpouae Board Gende Diversity and Stock Peformance, 89 N.C. L REV. 809, 828-29
(2011) (finding that in study of 400 companies when increasing diversity, stock prices
decrease significantly and there is no effect on profits).
76. See Trond Randoy et al., A Nordic Perspective on Corporate Board Diversity, 21-24
(Nordic Innovation Centre 2006) (analyzing gender diversity and corporate
performance in Denmark, Norway and Sweden).
77. Adams, supra note 75, at 292-93, 304 (finding that CEO turnover rates
indicate some aspects of decision making are improved by having a diverse board and
that women are more likely to sit on boards affecting directors' compensation);
(concluding firms perform worse measured in Tobin's q and return on assets with
greater diversity, unless firm has weak governance, because women are tougher
monitors).
78. Dobbins, supra note 75, at 811-13 (studying the impact of gender diversity and
corporate performance given the reaction of corporate investors).
79. Id. at 811 (finding that an increase in gender diversity Icad to a decrease in
the stock price). The study was conducted on more than 400 of the largest US irns
from 1997-2006. Id. at 813.
80. Id. at 835.
81. Id. at 821-22 (hypothesizing a negative impact on firm performance as a result
of increased gender diversity).
82. Id. at 829 (finding tdat when gender diversity is increased visible shareholders
increase their holdings in a company).
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investors and public pension funds are subject to public
accountability they Will be more Willing to support diversity."
Another critique of the business case rationale is that it has
been ineffective in actually achieving diversity. 4 In the Fortune
500 companies in the United States, the number of women on
boards increased from 15.7% to 16.1% from 2010 to 2011.8
According to the EU Commission's Justice database of gender
balance in decision-making positions, the average number of
women on the boards of the largest companies86 of each of the
EU Member States increased from 11.8% to 13.7% from 2010 to
2012.87 Thus, although advocates use the business case rationale
to help incentivize the promotion of diversity, critics hold that
diversity has not improved significantly.88
83. Id. at 812-13 (hypothesizing that investors that are scrutinized greater by
society are pressured into accepting diversit).
84. See Fairfax, Board Diversit Reisited, supra note 51, at 866 (arguing the flaws of
using business case rationale); Mike Noon, The Fatal Flaws of Diversity and the Business
Case for Ethic Minorities, 21 WORK, EMP'T & SOC'Y 773, 773 (2007) (criticizing use of
business case rationale to advocate for gender equality).
85. See Rachel Soares, et al., 2011 Cataly Census: Fortune 500 Vomen Board
Directors, ((atalyst December 2011) available at http://wmy.catalyst.org/file/533/
2011_fortune 500_census'wbd.pdf (2011) (reporting on number of female directors
on corporate boards in United States). The percentage of nomen on boards for all
companies in the United States increased from 12.5% to 12.9% from 2010 to 2011.
2011 Women on Boards Reports 10 (GovernanccMetrics International, Inc. 2011),
available at http://mT .caltrs.corn/corporategovernance/wnomen-on boards
2011.pdf (reporting on number of fenale directors on corporate boards in United
States).
86. "Largest" company is defined by the number of member of the primary blue-
chip index and registered in the country concerned. European Counission
http://cc.europa.cu/justic/gender-cquality/gender-decision-making/database/
business-linance/superv isory -board-board-directors/index-en.htm.
87. European Commission Database, supra note 5 (recording percentage of
women on boards in EU countries); Commission Progress Report, supra note 5, at 11.
The increase in diversity is largely attributed to the signiicant increase of women on
boards in France that have implemented mandatory quotas. Commission Progress
Report, supra note 5 at 11.
88. See Viviane Reding, Vice-President of the Eur. Comm'n, EU jusice Comm'r,
Mapping EU Action on Gender Equality: From Treaty of Rome to Quotas, Address at
the Harvard Club Belgiuin /Brussels (Oct. 8. 2012), available at http://curopa.cu/
rapid/press-releaseSPEECH-1 2-702_en.htm [hereinafter Reding's Speech]
(addressing arguments for implementation of a quota and concerns against
implementation); Kanter, supra note 3 (reporting on the initial introduction of the
gender quota proposal in September 2012).
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C. European Countries That Have Implemented A Gender Quota
Norway, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain
have already passed gender quota legislation." Additionally,
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom have passed "comply or explain"
regulations in their corporate governance codes." These
regulations mandate that companies comply with corporate
code or explain why they have not complied.91
1. Norway
Norway was the first country in Europe to pass a gender
quota on corporate boards.2 Norway's law, which took effect in
2006, calls for the highest percentage of women on boards in
Europe.> As a result, several studies examined the gender quota
in Norway and the impact that it has had on the affected
companies.
89. Catalyst, INCREASING GENDER DIVERSITY ON BOARDS: CURRENT INDEX OF
FORMAL APPROACHES 2-3 (2012) [hereinafter Catalyst Index], aailable t
http://www.catalysLo.rg/culrope/Approaches toIncreasingGenderDiversityi on
Boards-APRIL-EUROPE.pdf (reporting on legislation and policies implemented by
various European and other countries regarding women on corporate boards);
Commission Progress Report, supra note 5, at 13-14 (summarizing the countries that
have taken action to improve diversity on boards).
90. See Catalyst Index, supra note, at 89 (summarizing the countries that have
passed regulations regarding gender diversity on boards); Commission Progress
Report, supra notc 5, at 14 (summarizing the countrics in thc EU that have passed
regulations concerning gender diversity on boards).
91. See David Seidl, Standard Setting and Following in Corporate Governance: An
Observation: Theoretical Study of the Effectieness of Governance Codes. 14 ORG. 705. 708-09
(2007) (giving an example of having flexibility of code regimes); Ruth V. Aguilera &
Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Codes of Good Governance, 17 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT'l REV.
376, 383 (2009) (describing methods of voluntary firm compliance).
92. Catalyst Index, supra note 89 (summarizing the countries that have passed
gender quota legislation); Douglas M. Branson, Women on Boards of Directors: A Global
Snapshot, 3 (U. Pitt. Working Paper No. 2011-05, 2011) 6 (giving an overview of gender
quota legislation globally).
93. See European ( onnission Database, supra note 5 (tracking the progression of
women on boards from 2003 to 2012); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMINITILS,
Impact Assessment on Costs and Benefits of Improving the Gender Balance in the
Boards of Companies Listed on Stock Exchanges, COM (2012) 614, Final 39-40 (Nov.
2012) [hereinafter Commission Cost-Benefit Analysis] (graphing percetages of
women on boards in the EU and Norway).
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Norway passed its gender quota law, the Norwegian Public
Limited Liability Companies Act, in 2003, and it came into force
on January 1, 2006.94 Section 6-11a of the law requires that both
sexes be represented on the boards of public limited liabilities
companies.> The law mandated that public limited companies
have at least forty percent of women on their corporate boards
by 2008.96 If companies fail to comply with §6-11a, they are
subject to sanctions, including the possibility of dissolution of
the company.9 Since 2008, there has been 100% compliance
with the quota in Norway, as currently women make up forty
percent of the boards of publicly listed companies. 8
Critics of the Norwegian quota argue that while there are
an increased number of women on boards, the number of
female CEOs has not increased and remains at five percent."
Moreover, critics argue that the law does not lead to more
94. See Reiersen, supra note 2, at I (giving a background of the rise of Norwegian
legislation); Fact Sheet: The Legislation on Representation of Both Sexes in Boards, MINISTRY
OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY OF NoRwAY, http://www.regjcringen.no/cn/dcp/nhd/
pressesenter/fakta-ark/faktaarik-joniskvotering-i-styrer.htmlid=641431 (summarizing
Noiwcgian quota legislation).
95. Noiwcgian Public Limited Liability Companies Act, §6-11(a) (2009). Public
limited companies have a capitalization of at least one million Norvegian kroner with
share available to the general public. David A. Matsa & Amalia R. Miller. A Female Style
in Corporate Leadership? Evidence From Quotas, AM. ECWN. J.: APPLIED ECON. 5 (2012)
(using Norvay as a case study by studying the impact gender quota on corporate
boards).
96. See Rciersen, supra note 2 (detailing the requireicnts of Nonvegian's gender
legislation). See also MINISTRY OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, supra note 94 (giving a brief
over view of the Nonvegian law). The 2003 law was voluntary if all public limited firms
had at least forty percent female representation. however, by 2005, women filled only
twelve percent of the public limited corporations. AAGOTH STORVICK & MART TEIGEN,
WOMEN ON BOARD: THE NORWEGIAN EXPERIENCE, FRIEDRICH EBERT STFITUNG (June
2010) 8, available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07309.pdf (examining effect
of quota on Norwegian companies).
97. See Noiwegian Public Limited Liability Companies Act, §16-15 (mandating
sanctions for noncompliance).
98. See European Commission Database, supra note 5 (showing that Norway
reached forty percent female diversity by 2011): Riersein, supra note 2. at 5 (noting
that all Noiwegian firms have complied with the law).
99. Kenneth R. Ahern & Amy K. Dittmar, The Changing oj the Boards: The Impact on
Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation, 127 Q J. 01 ECON. 137. 139
(2012) (studying the effects of Nonvegian quota legislation on firm performance and
change in board demographics); Nicola Clark, The Female Factor-Getting Wonen Into
Boardrooms by Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2010, www.nytiles.com/, 2010/01/28/world/
curope/28iht-quota.hUni (reporting that under five percent of CEOs in Nonvay are
women).
GENDER TARGETS IN THE EU
women on boards.1 on Instead the quota promotes the "golden
skirts," or "trophy directors," where one woman sits on many
boards at one time.101
Recent studies have evaluated the effects of quotas on the
Norwegian companies, studying changes in the boards'
composition and the impact on firm performance.102 These
studies, discussed below, are indicative of how the proposed
quota may impact companies in the European Union.1as3
a. Board Composition
Researchers study board demographics to determine if
adding women to the board changes the demographic on the
board and how those changes affect corporate performance.1o4
Studies found a number of changes in board composition
100. See Anne Sweigart, Women on Board for a Change: The Noray Model oj
Boardroom Quotas As a Tool For Progress in the United States and Canada. 32 NwJ. OF INTIL
L. & 11US. 80A, 83A (2012) (studying Norwegian quota legislation as a means of
improving diversity in United States and Canada); see also Branson, supra note 92, at 4-
5 (examining diversity on corporate boards in various countries with a focus on
Norway).
101. See supra note 99 (arguing that only the same women are being added to
boards).
102. See generally Knut Nygaard, Forced Board Changes: Evidence From Nonvay
(Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration Mar. 2011) (studying
effects of information asymmetry on corporate performance after announcement of
quota in Norway); Ahern, supra note 99 (studying the impact of the Nonegian quota
on board demographics and corporate performance); Matsa, supra note 95 (comparing
the effects on companics affected and not affected by Noiay's quota). The effects of
the recent economic crisis may affect the firm's performance. Matsa, supra note 95, at
21-22 (explaining the effects of the recession on corporate performance). However,
Ahern's study does compare the effects of stock prices to that of Denmnark, Finland.
Sweden, and the U.S. as placebos. Ahern, supra note 99, at 163 (using placebos in
similar economic conditions).
103. Theo Verinaclen, Gender Quotas for Boards: How to Destroy European
Competitive, INSEAD Blog (Nov. 16, 2012) http://blog.insead.ediu/2012/ 1/
gender-quotas-for-boards-how-to-destroy-curopean-competitiveness (using the Ahern
study to critique the proposed directive); NATIONAL Ass'N OF PENSION FUNDS,
EU ROPEAN COMMISSION CONSULTATION, GENDER IMBALANCE IN CORPORATE BOARDS IN
THE EU 5 (2012) (using the Ahern study to evaluate the prudence of gender legislation
in the EU).
104. See Ahern, supra note 99, at 141 (studying how the change in the board
affecs firm performance); Matsa, supra note 95, at 18-19 (testing for whether firms
that had to change i[s board the most had a more negative impact on firm
performance).
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following the implementation of the quota in Norway.105 First,
from 2001 through 2009, the board size of Norwegian
companies remained roughly the same, indicating that boards
did not add women to fulfill the quota, but simply replaced male
directors.1o Second, the proportion of members on the board
with CEO experience declined in 2008.17 Third, the average age
of female board members was less than the male directors,
whose average age increased.o8 One study found that the
number of women with the same last name as another board
member increased from .97% to 3.82%, suggesting that to
comply with the quota some directors appointed family
members to the board.on Simply put, board members became
younger, with less CEO experience, and had an increase in the
number of board members who were related.110
b. Norwegian Corporate Performance and Policies After the
Passage of the Quota
In Norway, researchers found that there was greater change
in performance of companies with no women on the corporate
board pre-quota compared to the change in companies that had
at least one woman on the board pre-quota.i In the days
following the initial announcement of the quota in 2006, one
105. See Ahern, supra note 99, at 140-41 (summarizing findings on changes in
board demographics); Matsa, supra note 95, at 2-3 (explaining findings of changes in
board demographics).
106. Matsa, supra note 95, at 9. (finding that the board size did not signiicantly
increase post-quota). The number of board membciers increased slightly fron 2006 to
2009 fron 6.1 to 6.3. Id. See Ahern, supra note 99. at 153 (studying the shift in board
demographics post-quota); id. at 140-41 (indicating that the size of the board did not
significantly increase post-quota).
107. See Ahern, supra note 99. at 150 (studying the change in board experience
post-quota); see also Matsa, supra note 95, at 24 (examining the change in director
experience post-quota).
108. Ahern, supra note 99. at 153-54 (studying the change in the average age of
women versus men on boards post-quota); Matsa, supra note 95, at k-8 (finding the
average age of women to be lower than that of men on the board).
109. Ahern, supra note 99, at 154 (studying the change in board demographics
post-quota and hypothesizing based on the results).
110. See supra notes 106-09 (describing the results of studies of board
composition after the passage of the quota).
111. See Ahern, supra note 99, at 139 (finding companies that had no women on
the board perforimed worse than those that had at Icast one woman); Matsa; supra note
95, at 46 (finding firmLs tha[ had no women on the board prior to the (uoLa had a
greater decline in profits).
GENDER TARGETS IN THE EU
study found that the average stock return for firms with no
female directors went down -3.54%, and -0.02% for firms with at
least one female director.112 These value losses persist from 2002
until the end of the study." Companies with no women on the
board in 2006 suffered from greater decline in operating profits
compared to companies that had some women on the board." 4
Thus, the researchers concluded that the announcement of the
quota and its implementation had a negative effect on stock
prices in Norway.115
Also, after the passage of the quota, a number of firms
privatized or delisted.16 One study found that in 2009, there
were seventy percent fewer public limited companies in Norway
than there were in 2001.117 In fact, after 2001, the number of
private limited companies increased.118 These results suggest
that companies delisted to avoid compliance with the quota.' '9
112. See Ahern, supra note 99, at 139 (studying the impact of the announcement
of the gender quota law on firm's stock returns); Matsa, supra note 95. at n.2 and
accompanying text (discussing the findings ofAhern's study).
113. Ahern, supra note 99, at 139.
114. See Ahern, supra note 99. at 188 (concluding that announcing the quota law
had a negative impact on stock prices); see also Matsa, supra note 95, at 16 (studying
effect on firms farthest from compliance).
115. See Ahern, supra note 99. at 188 (concluding that announcing the quota law
had a negative impact on stock prices); see also Matsa, supra note 95, at 15 (describing
Ahern's study of stock prices after announcement of quota). The studies acknowledged
that these studies could not prove causation. but one study assuned causation because
there was no other significant event that wvould have affected stock prices and
compared stock prices to US firms surrounding the announcement of the quota. See
Ahern, supra note 99, at 156. Another study compensated by comparing the
performances to companies in Scandinavia, outside of Norway. See Matsa, supra note
95, at 2.
116. See Ahern, supra note 99. at 185 (testing to see if the cost of compliance is too
high for some companies so that they wvould rather delist recognizing there were other
reasons for companies to delist); see also Matsa, supra note 95, at 7 (focusing its study on
companies that were listed and noting the conversion of unlisted public companies to a
private status); Nygaard, supra note 102, at 25 fig. 2 (graphing the number of listed
firms versus private firms from 1999 to 2008).
117. See Ahern, supra note 99, at 141 (contrasting to the increased number of
private firms that were not affected by the quota).
118. See Ahern, supra note 99, at 184; see also Nygaard, supra note 102, at 25 fig. 2
(graphing the number of listed firms versus private firms from 1999 to 2008).
119. See Nygaard, supra note 102, at 14 (explaining how companies could avoid
compliance); see also Ahern, supra note 99, at 188 (finding that companies are more
likely to delist if there is a youngei r board with less CEO experience); Claire Braund.
Looking at the Big Picture on Gende, Dversity, WOMEN ON BOARDS (Oct. 13, 2010)
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2. Spain
Spain passed a gender quota in 2007 that requires publicly
traded companies with over 250 employees to have at least forty
percent of each gender on their boards within eight years after
the implementation of the law.120 Spain, however, has not
imposed any sanctions in the law for non-compliance.121
Compared with Norway and France, the percentage of women
on boards has not increased as dramatically in Spain. 122 From
2007 to 2012, the percentage of women on boards increased
from four to eleven percent, compared with Norway's increase
from six percent in 2002 to thirty-five percent in 2006.'1
Although Spain became the first EU Member State to pass a
gender equality law in 2007, they did so without establishing
sanctions for non-compliance. As a result, Spain has not
experienced a significant increase in the percentage of women
on boards.124
http://www.womenonboards.org.au/pubs/articles/norway bigpicture.htm. (reflecting
on impact of quotas in Noray in 2010).
120. Law for Effective Equality of Women and Men Title VII art. 75 (B.O.E. 2007
71) (Spain) available at http://noticiasjuridicas.com/basedatos/Admin/lo3-
2007.t7.html (electing quota legislation on corporate boards in Spain); see also Catalyst
Index, supra note 89, at 3.
121. Law for Effective Equality of Women and Men Title V II art. 75 (B.O.E. 2007,
71) (Spain) available at http://noticias juridicas.com/basedatos/Admin/lo3-
2007.t7.htmi (mandating gender quotas for certain corporations); see also Catalyst
Index, supra note 89, at 3 (summarizing Spain's quota law).
122. See European C ommission Database, supra note 5 (showing the percentage of
women on the board in EU countries and certain other surrounding countries);
Branson, supra note 92, at 6 (stating that Spain's quota is largely aspirational because of
the lack of sanctions).
123. See MARI1 TEICEN ) OMEN IN ECONOMIC DLCISION MAKING: DISCUSSION
PAPER NORW\ AY, 5 (European Commission 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
justice/gender-equality/files/cxchangcof good_practicenonodiscussion-paper
no_2012_en.pdf (giving a background on Nonvay's gender quota); see also European
Commission Database, supra note 5 (tracking the percentage of women on the board in
Spain from 2003 until 2012); Commission Progress Report, supra note 5, at 9 (charting
percentage of women on the board in the EU).
124. See European Commission Database, supra note 5 (showing Spain has not
increased its diversity as quickly as Norway and France after passing their quotas);
Branson, supra note 92, at 6 (stating that Spain's quota is largely aspirational because of
the lack of sanctions).
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3. France
On January 13, 2011 the French Assembl6e Nationale
passed a law requiring publicly traded companies, companies
with more than 500 employees, or companies with net sales or
total assets of at least £50 million to maintain forty percent of
each gender on their boards.' 2 The law requires compliance by
January 2017, and mandates that publicly traded companies
have at least twenty women on the board by January 2014 and
that boards with no women must appoint one woman by the
next general meeting.' b The law sanctions companies for non-
compliance by suspending payments to directors.'17 France saw a
dramatic increase in the number of women on boards, rising
from twelve to twenty-two percent between 2010 and 2012.128
One study found that the number of French companies with at
least one woman on the board increased from sixty-seven to
eighty-nine percent from 2009 to 2011.129
Proponents and critics of the proposed directive in the
European Union rely on the results of passing quotas in these
countries, in particular Norway, to evaluate how the proposed
directive will impact the European Union.so Norway and France
implemented quotas that resulted in significant increases of
diversity on boards, while Spain's quota has not lead to
significant increases in diversity in Spain's board of directors
125. Loi, n' 592 du 13 janvier 2011 relative a la representation equilibree des
feminmes ct des hominmes au scin des conscils dadninistration et de surveillance et A
1'6galit6 professionnelle [relating to the balanced representation of woncn and men
on boards of directors and supervisory and professional equality] art. 1, available at
http://ww,.assembice-nationale.fr/13/pdf/ta/ta0592.pdf (cffecting gender quota
legislation on corporate boards in France).
126. Id. art. 5 (detailing the timeirame for compliance).
127. Id. art. 1 (detailing the sanctions for non-compliance).
128. See European Commission Database, supra note 5 (looking at the largest
publicly traded companies on the national stock exchange). The percentage of women
on boards in France has increased to 16.6%, a 7.5% increase from 2009. See Kiniberly
Gladinan & Michelic Lamb, GMI Ratings' 2012 Women on Boards Survey, 7
(GMIRatings Mar. 2012), available at http:/,library.constantcontact.com/download/
gct/il/ 1102561686275-86/GMIRatingsWOB 032012.pdf (reporting on number of
women on boards in various countries).
129. Gladman, supra note 128, at 20 (reporting on number of companies with at
least one woman on the board).
130. See infra notes 161, 210 and accompanying text (referencing the quota in
Norway and how it shows support for and against the proposed directive).
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due to the lack of sanctions for non-compliance. 1sI Several
studies tested the effects of the quota in Norway and concluded
that, while the quota was 100% successful in achieving diversity
on boards, the law lead to a decline in stock prices and was
followed by the delisting of public companies.13
II. LfPLEMENTING AN EU-WDE GENDER LEGISLATION
Part II of this Note examines the directive proposed by the
Commission in November 2012, which set as its objective to have
forty percent women on boards for large, publically listed
companies incorporated in a member state. Part ILA describes
the requirements under the proposed directive and the
Commission's rationale behind the proposal. Part II.B states the
general arguments in opposition to the proposed directive, as
well as general concerns about gender equality legislation.
A. Arguments For A Uniform Law For Gender Diversity On Corporate
Boards In The European Union
1. The Requirements Under The Binding Directive
The EU directive proposes that companies set the objective
to have forty percent female non-executive directors on
corporate boards by January 1, 2020, with a 2018 deadline for
listed companies that are public undertakings) This directive
would affect companies incorporated in a Member State whose
securities are traded on a regulated market in one or more
Member States ("listed companies"). 134 Small and medium-sized
enterprises ("SMEs") are excluded from the application of the
131. See supra notes 98. 121-22, 128 and accompanying text (discussing the
increase of diversity on boards in Norway, Spain, and France).
132. See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text (discussing studies done on
effects of the quota in Norway).
133. See Proposed Directive, supra note 12, at art. 4(1) (establishing the tirnefrane
for compliance). Public undertaking is a company in which the public authorities may
exercise, directly or indirectly. A dominant influence where public authorities hold a
major part of the company's capital, control the majority of the votes attaching to
shares issued by the undertakings, or can appoint more than half of the members of
the undertaking's adnministraive, managerial or supcvisory body. Id. art. 2(9).
134. Id. art. 2(1) (establishing which companies would be affected by the law).
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directive.'5 In companies that employ a two-tier board system,
the directive applies to the supervisory board.' 6
Additionally, the directive applies to non-executive
directors or board members who are not involved with daily
management of the company. 37  The directive states that
companies must give priority to the candidate of the
underrepresented sex for a board position, if the candidate is
equally qualified, in terms of suitability, competence, and
professional performance.' Two years after the adoption of the
directive, companies must report to "competent national
authorities" once a year about their compliance, or if they have
not complied, the reason for non-compliance and the measures
they intend to adopt to comply. '
The directive requires that sanctions for non-compliance be
effective, proportionate, and dissuasive.4 1 Member States are
responsible for ensuring that companies comply with the
directive and for laying down sanctions for non-compliance. 141
Member States may impose administrative fines and nullify or
135. Id. art. 3 (providing for companies which are exempt from compliance).
SMEs are defined as companies with less than 250 employees and an annual turnover
less than or equal to C50 million, or an annual balance sheet less than or equal to C43
million, or the equivalent currency, if the SME does not use the curo. See id. art. 2(8).
136. Id. art. 2(5) (establishing which board members would be affected).
137. Id. art. 4(1); art. 2(4)-(5) (establishing which board members are aflected).
If women comprise at least one-third of a board, including executive and non-executive
positions, a Member State may hold that that company has met the objective. Id. art.
4(7) (providing for an exception for compliance). Furthermore, Member States may
allow listed companics that have lss than 10% females in their workforce to be excused
from complying with the objective. Id. art. 4(6). Although the proposed directive does
not impose a target for executive officers, affected companies must undertake
individual commitments for gender equality among executive officers to be achieved by
the same deadlines. Id. art. 5(1) (requiring Member States oversee that listed
companies take action for improving gender diversity among executive officers even
though the objective does not apply to them).
138. Id. art. 4(3). The proposed directive would give the Member State the
responsibility of ensuring, upon request from the losing candidate, that listed
companies are obliged to disclose the qualification criteria upon which the decision
was made, the objective comparativc assessmcnt of the criteria, and the considerations
in giving the position to the candidate of the opposite sex. Id. art. 4(4).
139. Id. arts. 5(2)-(3)). Companies must also publicly publish these reports. Id.
art. 5(3).
140. Id. art. 6(2) (providing guidelines for how Member States should sanction
non-compi lying companies).
141. Id. arts. 5(4),6(1) (providing monitoring responsibilities to Member States to
oversee companies' compliance).
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annul the appointment or election of a non-executive director
that has been made in opposition to the directive provisions.142
The Commission will review the progress of Member States and
reevaluate the directive by December 2021 to determine if the
renewal of the directive is necessary.143
2. Reasoning Behind A Binding Objective
Proponents offer several arguments for implementing a
binding directive providing for board diversity.144 The main
argument relies on the business case rationale, contending that
companies with greater board diversity outperform companies
in the same industry that are dominated by men.'14  The
European Commission emphasizes that companies with women
on their boards have a higher rate of return in sales, higher
return on invested capital, higher return on equity, and better
share price performance. 4  The improvement in firm
performance with women on the board is attributed to a more
productive working environment due to a more diverse and
collective mind-set and a wider range of perspectives for more
balanced decision-making. 147 Additionally, proponents argue
142. Id. art. 6(2) (providing exanples of sanctions Member States may issue for
non-compliance).
143. Id. arts. 9(2)-(4) (projecting the conclusion of the tiniefrane for the
legislation).
144. See Reding's Speech, supra note 88 (addressing arguments for
implementation of a quota and concerns against implementation); see also Proposed
Directive, supra note 12, at 3-4 (presenting argumcnts for why the directive should be
adopted).
145. See Reding's Speech, supra note 88 (citing to studies conducted that
companics with diversity on boards have better governance and financial
performance); see also Proposed Directive, supra note 12, at 5 (stating the purpose of
the directive is to improve financial performance); see also Nov. 14 Press Release, supra
note 10 (publicizing the reasoning behind the proposed directive); Henriette Jacobsen,
Reding Pushes 40% Female Quota on Corporate Boards, EULRACTIV, Nov. 15, 2012,
http://www.curactiv.com/ socialcu rope/comnmission-gives-green-light-gen-news-516048
(compiling various quoted reactions to the announcement of the proposed directive).
146. See Reding's Speech, supra note 88 (extolling the economic benefits of
having diversity on the board); European Commission. Women on Boards - Factsheet 1
- The Econonic Aigumcnts (Nov. 14, 2012) available at http://cc.europa.cu/justice/
gender-equality/files/wnomenonboards/factsheet-general-l-en.pdf (summarizing the
economic arguneints of the proposed directive).
147. See Nov. 14 Press Recase, supra note 10 (stating that diversity leads to a more
innovative environment due to a more diverse mindset with a wider range of
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that because women control seventy percent of global consumer
spending decisions, having more women on the board can
provide a better insight into consumer choices, which will
ultimately lead to a sales boost.148 Furthermore, by including
more women on the board, companies can take advantage of
the talent pool, where more than half of EU university graduates
are female .49 Expanding the available talent pool increases the
likelihood that the most suitable candidates, male and female,
are selected for the board.1 5o
Proponents also assert that the proposed directive will
benefit the European Union as a whole, beyond individual
corporations. 151 Citing the Europe 2020 Strategy, EU's growth
strategy, the Commission states that it is necessary to encourage
women to enter into the workforce and retain the women
already working, given the aging population that will result in a
shortage of skilled workers.' The Commission worries that the
low number of women on boards discourages women from
pursuing employment, which would only ensure that the
"vicious cycle" of gender employment and gender pay
differences continues.153
perspectives); see also Proposed Directive, supra note 12, at 16, 8 (stating that team
performance is enhanced when there is a greater range of perspectives on boards).
148. See Conmission Progress Report, supra note 5 at 7 (explaining that it is
benelicial for the board to mirror the market for a greater insight into consumer
choices); see also Reding's Speech, supra note 88 (arguing that there is a business
advantage in having women on boards given women's high involvement as a consumer
decision maker).
149. See Commission Progress Report, supra note 5, at 7 (arguing that expanding
the talent pool is a benefit of board diversity); see also Proposed Dirctive, supra note 12,
at 16 1 7 (arguing the benelits of have greater diversity on the board).
150. See Commission Progress Report, supra note 5, at 7 (explaining how
increasing the talent pool is beneficial to the board); see also Proposed Directive, supra
note 12, at 5 (arguing for the increase the percentage of women on the board).
151. See Reding's speech, supra note 88 (arguing that there is a macrocconomic
argument for having greater diversity on boards); Commission Progress Report, supra
note 5, at 7 (stating a macroeconomic benelit of having women in leadership
positions).
152. See Europe 2020, cc.curopa.cu/2020 (Oct. 15 2012), http://cc.curopa.cu/
europe2020/ europe-2020-in-a-nutshell/ targetsindex-en.httm (summarizing the EU
targets to be achieved by 2020); Nov. 14 Press Release, supra notc 10 (arguing the slow
growth of diversity in the EU as a reason for initiating proposed directive); Proposed
Directive, supra note 12, at 9 (noting the slow development of progress in the EU and
its inability to meet the goal set in Europe 2020).
153. See Commission Progress Report, supra note 5, at 7 (Stating that the glass
ceiling that keeps women out of decision making roles likely discourages them from
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The proposal's biggest advocate, Commission Vice-
President Viviane Reding, is pushing for the legislation out of
frustration that, despite the fact that sixty percent of university
graduates are female, there is slow growth of diversity on
corporate boards.154 In January 2011, Reding challenged
companies to sign a pledge to increase the number of women
on boards to thirty percent by 2015 and forty percent by 2020.155
By March 2012, however, only twenty-four companies had signed
the pledge.16 As a result of the pushback against her original
proposal for a quota in October 2012, Reding had to water down
her proposal to be a "binding objective." 7 Even so, her
reasoning for legislation remains the same.1 8
fulfilling their full professional potential); See Reding Speech, supra note 88 (arguing
that poor career prospects discourages women from remaining in the workforce).
154. See Press Conference, Mar. 3. 2012, available at http://cc.curopa.cu/
avservi e s/player/ stream ing.c fnty pe=ebsvod&sid=198355 (addressing progress of
diversity on corporate boards in EU); Commission Press Relcase, European Commission
Veighs Options To Break The 'Glass Ceiling' For Women On Conpany Boards. IP/12/213
(Mar. 5, 2012) available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIi-12-213-
en.htn?localccn [hereinafter March 3 Press Release] (publicizing the concerns of
lack of diversity of gender on corporate boards and lack of progress in the European
Union).
155. Commission Menorandun, spra note 68.
156. See March 3 Press Release, supra note 154, see also Commission Progress
Report, supra note 5, at 15.
157. See European Commission Adopts "Watered Down" Text on Company Gender
Quotas, PARTY OF EUROPLAN SOCIALISTS (Nov. 14, 2012), http://w/w.pes.cu/cl/lews/
european-commission-adopts-watered-down-text-company-gender-quotas [hereinafter
Part of European Socialists] (reporting on the party's disappointment in the less
demanding directive); BBC, EU Defends Women-on-Boards Plans, BBC Nov. 14, 2012,
http://wwv.bbc.co.uk/news/business-20322317 (reporting on the change in the
proposal after the postponement of the gender quota proposal because of strong
opposition).
158. See Frances Robinson, Conmission Approves Gender Proposal, WALL ST. J., Nov.
14, 2012 http://onlinc.wsj.comn/article/SB10001424127887324556304578118383
366062000.htmil (reporting on the announcement of the proposed directive); see also
Claire I)avenport, EU 1Wants Direct Action to Get Women Into Boardroons, REUTERS, Nov.
15, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/13/us-cu-gendcr-idUSBRE8A(0
PE20121113 (reporting on the expected announcement of the proposed directive).
Contrasted to a quota, this means that the Member States must implement policies that
strive in good faith towards the forty percent target. PARTY OF EUROPEAN SOCLISTS.
supra note 157 (reporting on the proposed directive fron the perspective of the Party
of European Socialists party); james Fontanella-Khan, Brussels Waters Down Board Quota
Plans, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2012, http://ww,.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f5562b3a-2d6f- 11c2-
9b88-00144feabdcO.htiml#axzz2Gn5H8oO0 (reporting on the forthcoming
announcement of the proposed directive).
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Arguing for quotas, Vice-President Reding also cites the
lack of significant improvement of diversity in the European
Union.159 From 2003 to 2012, the percentage of women on
boards increased from 8.5% to 13 .7 %, with an average .6
percentage points increase each year and some Member States
have less than five percent of women on boards.6o1 Countries
that adopted mandatory quotas, however, such as Norway and
France, significantly increased diversity on their boards.161 Thus,
advocates argue that stronger laws are required to get
companies to diversify their boards.'62
The Commission argues that this directive is necessary for
minimum harmonization.16 Minimum harmonization is the
ability of the European Union to pass legislation that is the
minimum standard, which helps to remove barriers from the
internal market.'14 It is required to ensure a competitive playing
field and to avoid complications in the interactions between
companies listed in EU Member States.'16 The difference in
159. See Reding's Speech, supra note 88 (explaining her frustration with the slow
progress of diversity in the EU); Kanter, supra note 3 (reporting on the initial
introduction of the gender quota proposal in September 2012).
160. See Commission Progress Report, supra note 5, at 11 (reporting on the
progress of diversity in the EU); see also European Commission Databas, supra note 5
(tracking the progression of diversity in the EU from 2003 to 2012).
161. See Reding's Speech, supra note 88 (using Norway and France as an example
to argue that kgislation is necessary); see also Proposed Directive, supra note 12, at 2
(using France and Norway as an example for the necessity of having legislation).
162. See Reding's Speech, supra note 88 (arguing that legislation is necessary). See
also Proposed Directive, supra note 12, at 2 (publicizing the necessity of proposing
legislation).
163. See Proposed Directive, supra note 12, at 5 (stating minimum harmonization
as a purpose of the proposed directive. See also Nov. 14 Press Release, supra note 10. at 3
(suinmarizing the elements covered under the proposed directive).
164. See TFEU, supra note 22, art. 114(1), 2010 0.J. C 83, at 94 (stating that the
EU should have as its object the establishment and functioning of the internal market).
See also Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms, 600
(Oxford UP, 2007) (explaining minimum harmonization is beneicial because it gives a
level playing field between Member States).
165. See Reding's Speech, supra note 88 (arguing that avoidance of disruption of
the internal market between Member States requires uniform gender legislation); see
also Nov. 14 Press Release, supra note 10 (arguing a uniforin policy on gender diversity
on boards is required for minimum harmonization). Minimum harmonization is the
ability of the EU to pass legislation that is the minimum standard, which helps to
remove barriers from the internal market. See TFEU, supra note 15, art. 114(1), 2010
0.J. C 83, at 94 (stating tLha the EU should have as its object tihe establishment and
functioning of the internal market); Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the
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gender diversity policies among the various Member States
presents a barrier to the internal market.166 The Commission
argues that the disparity between Member States leads to
inconsistent legal obligations of difficult comparability,
confusion, and higher costs for companies, stakeholders, all of
which hinders the proper functioning of the internal market. 167
3. Legality of Passing The Directive
To pass this directive, the Commission must ensure that the
directive may be legally enacted.168 The Commission has laid out
the legal basis for its proposed directive, asserting that it has the
power to ensure workplace equality under TFEU Article 157.)b9
More importantly, the directive must also fulfill the principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality.170
a. Subsidiarity
The proposed directive must meet the requirements under
subsidiarity)7' One of the reasons why the Commission decided
to initiate this gender equality legislation is to harmonize
differences in the gender requirements throughout the
EU: The Four Freedoms, 600 (Oxford UP, 2007) (explaining minimum harmonization
is beneficial because it gives a level playing Held between Member States).
166. See Proposed Directive, supra note 12, at 3 (arguing for the necessity of
having a EU directive governing gender diversity on boards); European Counissionjustice, Wormen on boards-Factsheet 3 Legal Aspects, (Nov. 14, 2012),
http://cc.europa.cu/justic/gender-cquality/files/woicnonboards/factshcet-gencral-
3_en.pdf [hereinafter Factshcet 3] (basing the proposal on the minimum
harmonization approach under proportionality).
167. See Proposed Directive, supra note 12, at 3 (giving background as to why the
proposed directive is necessary); Reding's Speech, supra note 88, (arguing that a
uniform EU law is necessary to prevent the disruption of the internal market).
168. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text (explaining the requirements
under proportionality).
169. The elements are that the action by the EU is necessary because it cannot be
achieved by the Member State alone and the objective can better be achieved at a
Union lcycl. See Proposed Directive, supra note 12, at 6 (stating its legal grounds under
which the proposal may be passed; Factsheet 3, supra note 166 (summarizing the legal
grounds of passing the directive).
170. See Factshect 3. supra note 166 (summarizing how the principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality are fulfilled); see also Proposed Directive, supra note 12,
at 9-11 (detailing how subsidiarity and proportionality are fulfilled).
171. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text (detailing the requircimcints of
subsidiarity under EU treaties).
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different Member States17 2 Currently, the Commission predicts
that by 2020, only France will have forty percent females on
boards, and only Finland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Slovakia,
Spain, Denmark, and Sweden will reach forty percent by 2035.'
This hinders the positive benefits of corporate performance. 74
The Commission believes that the failure of companies to sign
the pledge to improve gender diversity on the boards, plus the
slow rate of growth in certain Member States, further proves that
Member States will not implement their own gender equality
laws. 175
Without a uniform target for gender equality, Member
States will be hesitant to implement policies that are not in
effect in other Members States.1 " The Commission argues that
this is because Member States want to protect their companies
from any perceived risk that arises out of placing women on the
board that there competitors will not have.'77 Furthermore, the
Commission argues that the objective must be uniform to
achieve the proper functioning of the internal market.178
b. Proportionality
The Commission also must ensure that the directive fulfills
the principle of proportionality, which states that the
requirements under the directive "shall not exceed what is
172. See infra notes 208-15 and accompanying text (discussing Commission's
minimum harmonization arguments).
173. See proposed Directive, supra note 12, at 9 (discussing the necessity for the
directive as required under subsidiarity); Commission Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note
93, at 23 (giving a background of the problem of lack of diversity in thc EU).
174. See proposed Directive, supra note 12, at 9; Commission Cost-Beneit Analsis,
supra note 93, at 23 (giving a background of the problem of lack of diversity in thc EU).
175. See Proposed Directive, supra note 12, at 9 (reasoning why EU action is
necessary); see also supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text (discussing the failure of
companies to act under self-regulation and non-binding EU action).
176. See Proposed Directive, supra note 12, at 9 (providing reasoning for necessity
of passing a collective action directive); Commission Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note
93, at 26-27 (arguing that companies would not enact gender policies if their
competitors do not cither).
177. See supra note 177 (stating reasons why Member States are hesitant to enact
thcir own gender quota policies).
178. See Proposed Directive, supra note 12. at 9: see supra notes 163-67 and
accompanying text (discussing Commission's minimum harmonization arguments).
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necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties." 179 The
Commission argues that the binding objective is necessary given
the failure of non-binding objectives and recommendations
issued in the past and the failure of self-regulation.'so The
Council adopted two recommendations, one in 1984 and one in
1996, promoting positive action and equality in decision-making
that was ineffective in increasing the number of women on the
board to the number needed for "critical mass." 181 Moreover,
more recent attempts at non-binding actions were also
ineffective in improving gender diversity, including Reding's
challenge for companies to pledge to increase diversity.'8
Although the European Union may pass legislation
necessary to meet an objective set out in the Treaties, the
European Union is restricted to enacting only the narrowest
provisions that would achieve that objective.' 8 The Commission
argues that this directive stays within those parameters.* 4 First,
the directive is constructed under a minimum harmonization
approach.185 By using a directive, the Commission allows
Member States to determine how to best achieve the
requirements under the law and take into consideration
179. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (detailing the requirements to
meeting proportionality under EU treatics); See Factsheet 3. supra note 166, (briefly
summarizing the requirements of proportionality).
180. See Proposed Directive, supra note 12, at 10 (arguing that proportionality has
been met); see also Factshect 3, supra note 166 (summarizing arguments for how
proportionality has been met).
181. See also Factshect 3, supra note 166 (detailing prior action taken by the EU in
an attempt to improve board diversity). See generally Council Recommendation on the
Promotion of Positive Action for Women, 1984 O.J. L 331/34 (issuing a
recommendation for Member States to enact legislation for gender equality). See
Generally Council Recommendation on the Balanced Participation of Women and Men
in the Decision-Making Process, 1996 O.J. L 319/11 (issuing a recommendation for
Member States to enact lgislation for gender equality on corporatc boards).
182. See supra note 154-58 and accompanying text (discussing a failed attCmpt to
get companies to voluntarily improve their board diversity).
183. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying tcxts (detailing the requirements
under proportionality under EU treaties).
184. See Proposed Directive, supra note 12, at 10 (arguing that the directive is
within the parameters of the EU treatics): Factshect 3, supra note 166 (stating that the
directive has only what is necessary to achieve its objective).
185. See Proposed Directive, supra note 12, at 10 (arguing that the EU is taking
minimum action to ensure the objective is achieved); Factsheet 3, supra note 166
(giving an overview of the arguments that only the minimum action is being
undertaken in the proposed directive).
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independent circumstances that are specific to that Member
State.8 1 Member States may enact the appropriate enforcement
measures, and Member States that have already passed a quota
or other law may keep their own laws.'87 Moreover, the directive
does not require an undue change to company law and respects
the different board structures that exist within the European
Union. 188
Second, the Commission argues that the directive is not
overly burdensome.18 The forty percent objective only applies to
non-executive and supervisory board members, who are easier to
recruit.9oo In addition, several exceptions in the legislation
prevent it from being overly burdensome.')'
Third, safeguards are built into the directive that ensures
that women will not be automatic and unconditional appointed
because gender can only tilt the balance in favor of the woman if
two candidates are equally as qualified.1'9 Fourth, the directive
186. See Proposed Directive, supra note 12, at 10-11 (giving Member States
freedom to pass their own policies to show that the EU is not taking action beyond
what is necessary); Factsheet 3, supra note 166 (summarizing arguments for showing
that the EU is taking minimal steps)
187. See Proposed Directive. supra note 12, at art. 4(7) (allowing companies that
have at least one-third of the board is women to be exempted from compliance); id. at
art. 7 (allowing companics to enact policies beyond the minimum requirements). See
also Factsheet 3, supra note 166 (summarizing the freedom the companies have under
the law to implement their own policies).
188. See Proposed Directive, supra note 12, at 10-11 (describing the rights of the
Member States under the proposed directive); Factshect 3, supra note 166 (summary of
the rights of the Member States under the proposed directive).
189. See Proposed Directive, supra note 12, at 10-11 (arguing that the proposed
directive is not unduly burdensome); Factsheet 3, supra note 175 (summarizing that
SMEs are exempt from payment because the cost may be overly burdensome).
190. See Proposed Directive, supra note 12, at 10 (arguing it is not burdensome to
hire feimale non-executive directors); Factshect 3, supra note 166 at 2 (pages not
numbered) (stating that passing laws regarding non-executive directors is not overly
burdensome).
191. See Proposed Directive, supra note 12, at 10-11, 21 (exempting certain
companies under certain conditions from compliance). See also Hogan i Lovells, et al,
European Comnmission Publishes Proposed Directive To 1nprove Gender Balance, IEXOLOGY
(Dec. 14 2012) http://www.exology.com /libar y/dctail.aspxg-clbf7fba-afc5-4b7f-
99f8-baada5888756 (listing a summary of the provisions in the proposed directive). In
addition, the directive exempts companics that have less than ten percent of women in
their workforce from complying. See id. at 191 (reporting on the exceptions to the
proposed directive); see also Proposed Directive, supra note 12, at 21.
192. See Proposed Directive, supra note 12, at 12 (proposing that companies can
only hire a women if shte is equally as qualified as a man); Factshect, 3, supra note 166
(limiting the deference given to women during hiring).
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automatically expires in 2028, when it will be reevaluated to
determine if the directive should continue"
The Commission also conducted a cost-benefit analysis of
gender equality legislation.1 4 In a Staff Working Document, the
Commission found that binding measures are more effective in
achieving gender equality and "generate more societal and
economic benefits."1 95 On the other hand, however, binding
measures also increase costs and the administrative burden, and
forces greater interference with the right of the company and its
shareholders."
The cost-benefit analysis estimates a EUE17.5 billion
increase in net income under the proposed directive.197 The
Commission estimates from 2017-2020, the total annual
investment costs will be C 18.3 million, and from 2021-2030,
EUE3.5 million. 1 Furthermore, the estimated administrative
burden of monitoring is EUE100,000 and the total annual cost
of reporting is EUC124,000.1 Thus, because benefits greatly
193. See Proposed Directive, supra note 12, at 22 (stating that within the principle
of proportionality the directive will be reevaluated in 2028 to determine if it is still
necessary); see also Factshect 3, supra note 166, at 4 (pages not numbered)
(sunmarizing why the directive fulfills proportionality).
194. Commission Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 93, at 8 (analyzing the cost
versus benefits of implementing various gender legislation, including the proposed
directive). The Commission analyzed five different gender equality legislative options:
1) No new action (non-binding, 2) issue a Recommendation (non-binding), 3) pass a
directive with a 40% target for non-executive board members (binding), 4) issue a
directive with a 40% target for non-executive board members and a flexible target for
executive directors (binding), and 5) issue a directive with a 40% target for both non-
executive and executive officers (binding). See id. (stating the possible legislative
options regarding gender diversity on boards).
195. Id. at 58 (studying two non-binding and three binding legislation options to
balance the Cost and benefit of employing each option). The study looked at the
societal benefits by analyzing the enhancement to company reputation, development of
role models, changes in recruitment policies and employees' identification with a
company. Id. at 45.
196. Id. at 58 (studying the costs of employing binding lkgislation versus non-
binding legislation).
197. See Commission Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 93, at 54 (comparing the
increased benefits of having binding objective).
198. See id. (estimating investment costs of various possible gender diversity
legislation).
199. See id. (estimating admiiinis tratLive costs of various possible gender diversity
legislation).
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outweigh costs, the Commission argues proportionality is
satisfied.200
B. Arguments Against The Binding Objective
Several Member States and EU Commissioners raised
vehement objections when Vice President Reding first
announced her plans of a gender quota.201 In particular nine
Member States, led by the United Kingdom, wrote a letter to the
Vice-President and to the Commission president, Jose Manuel
Barroso, expressing their opposition to the proposed quota. o0
The letter stated that in accordance with the subsidiarity
principle, the responsibility of increasing diversity should be left
to the individual Member States and that Member States needed
more time to see if already implemented legal devices lead to
improved gender equality.2o3
Despite having a more positive response to the change in
the proposal from a quota to an objective, critics still believe that
a EU directive should not regulate gender equality on boards.204
Critics opposed the proposed legislation for several reasons.
First, opponents of gender equality legislation argue that
Member States should have the power to determine their own
200. See Proposed Directive, supra note 12. at 7-8 (opting for option 4 based on
the cost-benelit analysis); Commission Cost-lenelit Analysis, supra note 93, at 59-60
(suinmarizing its study of the five different options).
201. See Letter of Opposition, supra note 8 (expressing opposition to the
proposed plan for gender quotas in the EU); see also Valentina Pop, EU Commissioner p
For 'ight' on Gender Quotas, EU OBSERVER (Oct. 2, 2012, 5:25 PM)
http://cuobserver.coi/cconomic/ 117715 (reporting on the September
announcement of Reding's proposal for quotas in the EU); see alsoJanes Fontanella-
Khan, Brussels Drafts Board Gender Quota FIN. TIMES, (Sept. 7, 2012),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cm0s/s/0/5c2cb34-ftdc- lel-b4ba-00144feabdcO.html#axzz2
FKW1WXeF7 (reporting on initial proposal for gender quota in September 2012).
202. Letter of Opposition, supra note 8 (expressing its opposition to the
implementation of quotas for wonen on the board).
203. See id. (objecting to uniform legislation without individual policies for each
country).
204. SeeVince Cabic, Business Secretar's Statement on European Commissions Proposed
Directive on Improving Gender Balance on Europes Corporate Board, DEPARTMENT FOR
BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND SKILLS (Nov. 14, 2012, 11:09 AM),
http://rnn.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/Press-Recases/Busincss-Secretary-s-statement -on-
European-( ommnission-s-proposed-directive-on-inproving-gender-balance-on-iurope-s-
corporate-boards-6834b.aspx (reacting to announcement of proposed directive); see
also Jacobsen, supra note 145 (compiling various quoted reactions to the
announcement of the proposed directive).
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laws and policies.2 fl The UK Business Secretary Vince Cable
stated in response to the announcement of the proposed
directive that while the UK appreciates the decision of the
Commission to not impose mandatory quotas, the UK believes it
is best to consider increasing women's representation at a
national level.2on Given the economic crisis, critics believe
countries should focus on staying afloat and not gender
equality.211
Furthermore, during a European Parliament debate, a
minister argued that the best people for boards have already
been chosen:1" Thus, adding women onto the board only
promotes mediocrity, especially if the country does not have the
female talent pool to fill board seats. 09 Critics argue that this
occurred in Norway.210 The quota only established mediocrity on
the board by adding "golden skirts," female board directors who
205. See Letter of Opposition, supra note 8; see also jacobsen, supra note 145.
206. Cable, supra note 204: see also DUTCH GOVERNMENT, MINISTRY OF
EDICATION, CLILTLIRL AND SCIENCE, PUBLIC CONSLTATION. available at
http://ec.europa.eu /ustice/newsroom/gender-equality/opinion/iles/ 120528/pa/
295_en.pdf (last visited Apr. 2. 2013) (responding to solicitation of public consultation
regarding gender quotas in the EU fron Dutch government).
207. Se Theo Vernaelen, Gender Quotas Jor Boards: How to Destroy European
Competitiveness, INSEAD) BL OG, (Nov. 16, 2012), http://blog.iisead.edu/2012/l l/
gender-quotas-for-boarIds-how-to-destroy-curopean-competitiveness (expressing
negative opmiion of implementing gender equality legislation because of
encouragement of mediocrity): see also Fontanella-Khan, supra note 3: see also Hans
Bader, European Union Pushes Harniful Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards. Examiner,
(Mar. 6, 2012), http: //Twy.examiner.com/article/european-union-pushes-harmfiil-
gender-iuotas-for-corporate-boards (criticizing EU plans for gender quotas).
208. Remarks of Paul Nuttall, Eur. Par. Deb. (17) (Mar. 12, 2012), available at
http://wwv.europar.europa.eu/sides/getl)oc.dopubRef=-//El//TEXT+(RE+
20120312+ITEM-017+DO(XML+V0//EN (debating inter alia gender quotas in the
EU among incinbers of the European Parliament).
209. See id.; see also Kingsley Napley & Aimy Griffiths, Not Enough Women on Boards?
Or Not Enough Women Who Are Qualified? Ass. Corp. Counsel (Oct. 14, 2011),
http://wmy.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx'g=28bf620d-c249-4tbc-87d9-
78142ea53c 12 (questioning whether there are a sufficient number of qualified wvomen
to be placed on boards); see also Jabeen Bhatti, The Quota Wars, GERMAN TIMES, (June
2011) http: //www.geriman- imes.com /index.php?optionconcontent&task-view&id=
41578&Itemid= 12 (reporting on a variety of opinions of Norway's gender quota and its
impact).
210. See Branson supra note 92, at 8-9 (arguing that when companies must quickly
find wvomen to be placed on boards this wvill lead to under qualified wvomen to be
placed on the board or the placement of one qualified woman on too many boards);
see also supra, notes 137-38 (studying the impact of the quota on companies in
Norway).
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are a small pool of women who are placed on too many boards
to effectively manage their duties or by adding women who were
unqualified for the position. 1 1 Further, the women being added
to the board were younger and had less CEO experience.2'1
Accordingly, critics claim that the economic benefits cited in
advocacy of the gender directive are not certain.21
Second, both proponents and critics of gender equality
argue that to encourage diversity on the board, company
policies should be implemented to allow women more flexible
hours to allow them to spend time with their families .' 4 Critics
argue that quotas only focus on the result without considering
the barriers that women face in the corporate pipeline.215 A UK
211. See Branson supra note 92, at 8-9 (describing the adverse consequenccs of
implementing quotas as a means of improving diversity); see also Brian Groom, DVersity
Reigns As WomenJump On Board, FIN. TIMFS, (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.ft.con /intl/
cms/s/0/c9841b46 -6c6d -1c1-bd0c-00144feab49a.hunl#axzz2F~KfWeF7 (reporting on
the criticism regarding Norway's necessary use of golden skirts" to fulill its quota).
212. See Groom, supra note 211 (reporting on progress of women on boards one
year after Lord Davies report was issued in the UK); see also supra, notes 99-101
(showing that boards in Norway became younger and had less CEO experience after
the quota was impleimented).
213. See id.
214. See LATVTAN MINISTRY OF WEIFARE, PUBLIC CONSULTATION, EUR. COMM'N
JUSTICE (2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/uistice/newsroom/gender-equality/
opinion /files/120528/pa/ 294_lv.pdf [hereinafter LATVIAN PUBLIC CONSULTATION]
(responding to solicitation of Commission's public consultation regarding gender
quotas in the EU from the Latvian government); see also CZFCH (hOVERNMFNT, PUfBLIC
CONSULTATION, EUR. COM'N JUSICE (2012), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/ustice/newsroom/gender-equality/opinion/iles/ 120528/pa/
278_cs.pdf [hereinafter CZECH GOVERNMENT PUBLIC CONSULTATION] (responding that
a reconciliation between family and life and work life is a measure that should be
addressed to improve gender equality on boards); see also FEDERAI CHANCELLERY OF
AUSTRIA, FEDERAI MINISTER FOR WOMEN AND CTVI. SERVICE, PUBLIC CONSUITATION,
EUR. COMM'N JUSTICL (2012), available at http://cc.curopa.cu/justice/newsrooml/
gender-equality/opinion/i1es/120528/pa/276_en.pdf (supporting quotas, but still
believes other measures need to be taken into account); see also BARCEI.ONA CITY
COUNCIL, PUBLIC CONSULTATION, EUR. CONIMN JUSTICL (2012), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/gender-equality/opinion/iles/ 120528/pa/
287_cs.pdf (supporting quotas, but still believes other measures need to be taken into
account); see also Louisa Peacock, Women on Boards? Some Chairmen Are Alissing The
Point, TEL EGRAPH (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/inance/jobs/
9678670/women-on-boards-Soie-chairmen-are-imissing-the-point.htL.
215. See Peacock. supra note 214: see also Geraldine Gallacher, All Aboard? The EU
Looks Again at Quotas Jor Women on Boards, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 14, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/'geraldine-gallachier/women-business-gender b
2121374.hun (expressing opinion on the proposed directive and the lack of women
coming up the corporate pipeline as a potential problem).
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study showed a "leaking pipeline," where a comparable number
of women as men are employed at a junior level, but fewer and
fewer women remain going up the corporate ladder.216 Critics
argue that providing flexible hours and affordable, adequate
daycare will prevent women from choosing between their
careers and their family obligations: 17 Third, critics argue that
by mandating that companies add more women to the board,
women who are chosen will be respected less. 218 Placing a
woman on the board in response to outside pressure will signal
to the employees and other directors that the woman is not
qualified and was only brought on to fulfill the target.' 0
In summary, proponents of the directive believe that the
directive may be legally passed, and would be effective in
improving diversity on boards and would be economically
216. See Lord Davies of Abersoch, Women on Boards, U.1K. DEP'T FOR BUS.
INNOVATION & SKILLS 15-16 (Feb. 23. 2011), available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/
biscore/business-lawv/docs/w/ I 1-745-wornen-on-boards.pdf (reporting on board
gender diversity in the UK and suggesting solutions); see also IRENE JANSSFN, PUfBTIC
CONSULTATION, EUR. COMM'N JUSTICE (2012), available at http://cc.europa.cu/
justice/newvsroom/gender-equality/opinioni/f1es/ 120528/individual/nlnl.pdf
[hereinafter Lord Davies Report] (responding to solicitation of Commission's public
consultation regarding gender quotas in the EU).
217. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
218. See Nicholas Cecil, Board Quotas Risk Demean in Women, Sav Equalities Chief
LONDON EVENING STANDARD, (Oct. 10. 2012), http:/ /ww.standard.co.uk/news/uk/
board-quotas-risk-demeaningi-woen-says-equalities-chief-8205165.htmI (opining that
gender quotas actually devalue wonen); see also Pop, supra note 201 (reporting on
opinion of forner Latvian president Vaira Vike-Freiberga on gender quotas); see also
Gabriella Griffith, Are Boardroom Quotas for Women Patronizing or Positive?,
LONDONLOVES1BUSINESS (Mar. 6, 2012),
http://wwdlonoilovesbusiness.coi/business-in-london/business-regulation/are-
boardroor-quotas-for-women-patronising-or-positive /1842.article (opining that gender
quotas are patronizing for women who are appointed to boards); see also Leo
Cendrowicz, Can Man datory Quotas Bring Gender Equality to Europe's Boardrooms?, Time.
(Mar. 8, 2012), available at
http://www.time.col/time/world/artickc/0,8599,2108607,00.htmLi (reporting
novement towards gender legislation and finding that sone women believe this
undermines wornen in the workplace).
219. See Griffith, supra note 218; see also Genna Variak, Women On Boards Quota
To Threaten Mlultinationals?, INT'L FIN. L. RLV. (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.ifhr.com/
Article /3085297/Women-on-boards-qiiota-to-threaten-Europe-rmultinationa s.html
(reporting on criticisms of the implementation on an EU gender quota); see also Louisa
Peacock & Philip Aldrick, Female Executives Warn Govenrnent Against Using "Patronising"
Board Quotas, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/inance/
yourbusiness/8343997/Female-executives-warn-Governicnt-against-using-patronising-
board-q ouotas. htll I (reporting opinions of femnale executives that are oppose use of a
quota).
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beneficial, both in a micro and macroeconomic way. Critics
argue, on the other hand, that the directive will lead to
mediocrity on boards and will not be effective in addressing the
bigger problem that leads to the lack of women on boards,
which is the lack of support for women climbing the corporate
ladder.
III. THE EUROPEAN UNION PROPOSED DIRECTIVE IS LEGAL,
BUT NOT SUFFICIENT
A. Is The Di rective Legal?
Under the EU treaties and the Charter of Fundamental
Human Rights of the European Union, the European Union
may take positive action to ensure equal employment
opportunities of women and men.22o Also, the Charter of
Fundamental Rights expressly states that while there must be
equality between men and women in the area of employment,
this principle does not prevent the adoption of measures that
will tip the scales in favor of the under-represented sex.221 On its
face, the directive does not violate these treaties or the
Charter.22 The directive is a positive action to promote equal
opportunity between men and women, which TFEU Article 157
allows.223 Additionally, while critics may argue that the directive
is discriminatory against the men who are turned down in favor
of a woman, the Charter of Fundamental Rights permits this
because the European Union may enact measures that give a
specific advantage in favor of underrepresented sex."2
220. See supra text accompanying notes 19-35 (discussing the EU's ability to take
positive action regarding gender equality and employment).
221. Charter of Rights, supra note 23, art. 23. 2012 O.J. C 83, at 396 (providing the
right to take positive action to protect the underrepresented sex); see also supra text
accompanying notes 27-30 (discussing the Charter of Rights' protection of equality in
employment and the allowance for the EU to protect the underrepresented sex).
222. See supra notes 20-35 (detailing powers given in the treatics and the Charter
of Rights to protect equality in the workplace).
223. See TFEU, supra note 15, art. 157(3), 2010 0.J. C 83, at 118 (giving the
Council and Parliament the ability to pass legislation to protect gender equality); see
also supra notes 31-34 (discussing the power of the EU to take positive action to protect
equality).
224. See Charter of Rights, supra note 23, art. 23, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 396 (allowing
the EU to take positive action in favor of an underrepresented sex); se also supra notes
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However, the directive must meet the requirements under
the principle of subsidiarity; the directive can be enacted only if
the objective of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently
achieved individually by the Member States or if the action
would be better achieved at a Union level " Because the
objective of the European Union is to raise the percentage of
women on boards throughout the European Union to forty
percent by 2020, the directive fulfills the principle of
subsidiarity.26 Subsidiarity is fulfilled because Member States
could not achieve the forty percent objective on its own and
forty percent can be better achieved at a EU level.22
Member States will not be able to achieve the forty percent
objective by 2020.228 As in Norway and France, diversity will only
drastically improve with strong legislation.2" 9 While the United
Kingdom has implemented a non-quota policy to improve
gender diversity with positive results? in other Member States
diversity improved at a much slower rate.23' Over the last three
years, diversity improved only 0.6 percentage points throughout
the EU."2 Some Member States have less than five percent
women on their corporate boards.23 Without a strong EU
28-30 (stating that the principle of equality should not prevent the adoption of
incasurcs in favor of the under-represented sex).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52 (discussing the requirements under
subsidiarity); see also TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 15, art. 5(3), 2010 0.J. C 83, at 18
(limiting the EU's power to pass lkgislation).
226. See supra note 152 (discussing Europe's 2020 target to have the EU average at
40% females on corporate boards).
227. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text (discussing the inability of EU
Member States to reach a forty percent level by 2020.)
228. See id.
229. See supra notes 94-98 (describing the implementation of the quota in Norway
and the resulting full compliance); supra notes 125-29 (explaining the quota law
passed in France and noting the rapid increase of the number of women on boards
following the legislation).
230. See European Commission Database, supra note 5 (showing an increase in
percentage of women in the LK). See also Press Release, Dep't for Bus. Innovation &
Skills, Women on Boards: Code of Conduct One Year On, (July 24, 2012), available at
http://news.bis.gov.uk/Press-Rclases/Women-on-boards-code-of-conduct-one-year-on-
67d9 .aspx (analyzing diversity on boards in 2012 since 2011).
231. See European Commission Database, supra note 5 (showing the slow growth
in the percentage of woni on boards in certain EU countries).
232. See supra notes 160, 189 and accompanying text (discussing the impetus
behind proposed directive).
233. See supra note 160 (discussing the lack of iiproventc[ in diversity in the
EU).
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policy, Member States like Spain will not pass laws that will force
change on corporate boards.234 Accordingly, subsidiarity is
fulfilled because the directive is necessary to achieve forty
percent of females on boards by 2020.23
Under the principle of proportionality, the goal of the
proposed directive of having forty percent female
representation on boards must be legitimate.2" The legitimacy
of the proposed directive is most vulnerable to attack where it
uses the business case rationale. 3 While some studies show that
corporations benefit from having women on the board, these
studies are unable to show causation between the presence of
women on the board and the improved corporate
performance.238 Without causation, it is possible that better-
performing firms are diversifying because they have the
resources and time to focus on improving diversityV.23
Several studies show that diversity, whether racial or
gender, has no effect on corporate performance, and may even
have a negative effect.24 o According to the studies done in
Norway, where there has been full compliance with a quota law
since 2008, improving diversity does not guarantee improved
corporate performance.2' Not only did stock prices and
operating profits decline, but these decreases were greater for
companies that had no women on their board initially.242 If this
trend occurs in other countries, businesses might experience a
234. See supra notes 120-24 (describing Spain's quota law and the lack of
significant improvement in gender diversity on boards).
235. See supra notes 228-34 (analyzing arguments that the Commission has
fulfilled the principle of subsidiarity).
236. See supra note 45-50 (discussing the proportionality requirements).
237. See supra notes 53-60 (discussing the use of the business case rationale to
advocate for the proposed directive).
238. Seesupra notes 71-74 (describing the study by Carter that could not prove
causation between diversity on boards and firm performance).
239. See id.
240. See supra notes 75-77 (describing studies that diversity had no effect or
ncgativc effect on corporate performance).
241. See supra notes 114-15 (describing studies performed in Norway that
examine the effects of the gender quota).
242. See id. (discussing the Ahern and Nygaard studies that found that Companies
tLha had no women on the board prior to the announcemenlLt of the quota suffered
more afterwards).
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negative impact.M* Because there is no clear answer as to
whether diversity is good for business and because it has been
shown that in Norway quotas harmed firm performance, it is
difficult to use the business case rationale to establish that
improving corporate performance is a legitimate objective of
mandatory quotas.244
However, the Commission may have a legitimate objective.
Achieving minimum harmonization where the internal market
would suffer because of the differences in the quota laws and
gender equality regulations between various Member States is
still a legitimate objective that the Commission can legislate .245
The directive would have to show that the benefits of
harmonizing the laws between Member States outweigh the cost
of either adding women to the board, or implementing policies
that encourage the appointment of women.246 While the
Commission estimates that the burden of compliance will be
low, insofar as it affects the cost of complying, compared with
the increase in net profit, the Commission does not address the
cost of possible consequences that were seen in Norway.2 47
More specifically, additional consequences include the cost
of companies avoiding compliance by privatizing or delisting. 248
According to the study by Jung and the accountability theory,
this phenomenon in Norway could be explained by the fact that
Norway's corporations have concentrated ownership and are
willing to privatize and delist because they are less subject to
shareholder control and the public opinion24 9 Considering that
most of the Member States also have corporations with
243. See id. (showing the negative impact on companies wvith no nomen on the
board post-quota in Norway). See also Commission Progress Report, supra note 5.
(reporting the countries in the EU with lcss than five of women on boards).
244. See supra notes 54-56 (discussing studies that show diversity improves
corporate performance): (f supra notes 72-80 (explaining studies that show that
diversity has no effect or is harmful to corporate performance).
245. See supra notes 165-67 (discussing the concern of the minimum
harmonization in the EU without a uniform gender legislation).
246. See supra note 45-50 (detailing the requirements under proportionality).
247. See generally proposed Directive, supra note 12 (lacking consideration of any
other costs, such as the cost of companies delisting or moving to countries outside of
the EU).
248. See supra notes 1I16-19 (detailing the cost and benefit analysis conducted on
this proposal).
249. See id. (explaining the accountability tiory thia[ more publicly accountable
companies find it harder to disapprove of diversity).
GENDER TARGETS IN THE EU
concentrated ownership it is likely that at least some of them will
delist.250  When deciding on the legality of this directive, the
Council and the Parliament should consider the possible costs
of delisting, to determine if the benefits of minimum
harmonization outweigh the costs of avoidance25'
The European Union, however, does have a legitimate
interest in promoting equality in the EU.252 The EU treaty
protects the equality of women in employment and the Charter
of Fundamental Rights makes gender employment equality a
fundamental right.2 5Additionally, the treaty gives the European
Union the power to take positive action to promote the
underrepresented gender.254 Social rationales may have more
legitimacy because they do not require a showing of causation
and proof as the business case rationale and so can give more
legitimacy as a reason to implement diversity policies<5
Presuming that the objective of diversity is legitimate under
the business case rationale, the specific requirements to achieve
the objective must be reasonable under the principle of
proportionality. 2M Here, using a forty percent target for females
on the board is reasonable. The critical mass requirement, thirty
percent, must be met under the business case rationale for firms
to experience increased firm performance2 Critics could argue
that because the forty percent target goes above the thirty
percent, this directive goes beyond what is necessary and fails
the proportionality requirement.258 However, under a social and
250. See Reinier Kraakman et al., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW/: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 29-30 (2d ed. 2009) (giving an overview of
comparative corporate law between the United States, Japan and European countries);
see generally Marco Becht & Colin Mayer, Corporate Control in Europe (2000), available
at http://cconomics.ouls.ox.ac.uk/ 11439/1/ccineurope.pdf (deliberating the
relationship between ownership control and corporate management).
251. See supra notes 60-61 (detailing the requirement under proportionality that
only necessary actions be undertaken).
252. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text (describing the EU's
responsibility to protect equality in the workplace).
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (critiquing the business case
rationale).
256. See supra note 56 (discussing the proportionality requirements).
257. See supra note 86-90 (discussing the critical mass theory).
258. See supra note 22 (describing tie requirement under proportionality that
limits EU action to what is necessary).
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moral objective to pursue equal gender employment in the
board, forty percent works better towards achieving that goal,
while not overly burdening the corporations. Therefore, forty
percent is not more than what is necessary to achieve the
obj ective.
B. The Directive Is Not Enough To Promote Diversity
While this directive is a step in the right direction for
gender equality, it is not enough to improve diversity
throughout a company.29 The European Union should require
that several other policies should be implemented in addition to
the objective. In addition, the European Union should consider
bottom-up policies to better improve diversity because there is a
"leaking pipeline" where the number of women in companies
decrease when going up the corporate ladder. o
First, corporations must remove barriers that prevent
women from both having a family and being promoted to
management positions.261 While the general overlooking of
women by the committee that chooses board members will be
addressed in the proposed directive for board positions, the
directive does not remedy the number of women voluntarily
leaving because of family pressures.262 To prevent women from
leaving the workforce, the European Union should mandate
that corporations adopt measures, such as more flexible hours,
affordable day care, and more flexible and understanding
maternity leave.26
Second, corporations have to create a safe and fair working
environment for employees, so that women do not feel excluded
while working.264 Women do not want to work in an
259. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text (discussing the loss of women
in the workplace going up the corporate ladder).
260. See supra note 216 (describing the "laking pipeline" where women leave
compamies going up the corporate ladder).
261. See supra notes 214-17 (discussing the critique of the proposed directive).
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See jennifer K. Brooke & Torn R. Tyler, Diversity and Corporate Performance: A
Review of the Psychological Literature, 89 N.C. L. R. 715, 732 (2011) (studying the use of
psychological methods to improve diversity in corporations); see also Lord Davies
Report, supra note 216, at 30-33 (studying the reasons that women leave their jobs).
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environment where they feel unwelcome.2 6 Isabella Lenarduzzi,
a former board member at Reed Elsevier, stepped down because
she felt that as the only female board member surrounded by
men, none of the men listened to her when she spoke.266 As the
Polish government suggested in its public consultation, anti-
discrimination initiatives should be implemented to get women
more incorporated into the workforce26
Third, one of the main arguments against the gender
diversity legislation and the promotion of women in general is
the lack of qualified women.268 While various business schools
have compiled a long list of thousands of women who are board
ready, the reality is that board members will choose directors
that they know.N2t Thus, there could be an increase in females in
management position if there was a mentorship and training
program implemented that would pair current board members
with females working in corporations.270 This would help women
make the important networking connections to get on a board
and encourage women to go for a board position. 71 In Australia,
the Australian Institute of Company Directors launched, in April
2010, a mentoring program that not only mentored women to
become board ready, but also pledged to place each women on
a board by the end of the year. Throughout the next year, fifty-
nine women were appointed to corporate boards, compared to
265. See Brooke, supra note 315, at 723 (discussing psychological adversity to
diversity). See also Lord Davies Report, supra note 216 at 29 (showing women leave the
workplace because of a hostile environment).
266. See Cendrowicz, supra note 218 (discussing the impact that a gender quota
could have in the EU).
267. Polish Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Protection, Public
Consultation, (last visited June 1, 2013) http://cc.europa.cu/justicc/newsroom/
gcnder-cquality/opinion/files/120528/pa/296_cn.pdf (responding to Commission's
solicitation of public consultation regarding gender quotas from the Polish
governmcnt).
268. See supra notes 209-12 (examining the critiquc against the proposed
directive that states there aren't enough qualified women to fill seats on boards).
269. For example, in Norway after the quota was passed. the number of directors
on the same board with the same last namc increased, making it likely that board
directors chose their family members or their spouses. See Ahern, supra note 99, at 154
(finding that board members were likely to appoint their female board mcinbcrs).
270. Australia Institute of Company Directors, Directors Take the Lead in Helping Put
W1onen on Boards, (Apr. 22, 2010) http://www.companydirectors.com.au/General/
Headcr/Media/Media-Relcases/2010/Directors-takc-thc-icad-in-helping-put-woin-
on-boards (publicizing iminiorship program for women reaching for board positions).
271. See id.
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the ten appointed the previous year.2 72 The implementation of a
similar program in the EU, with the specific pledge of placing
women on the boards within the year, could be a good
supplement to the directive.
CONCLUSION
The European Union is admirably trying to increase
diversity in corporations by a trickle down directive of gender
equality on the corporate boards. The Vice President of the
Commission, Viviane Reding, has wisely chosen not to
implement quotas in the face of the vehement reaction against
the strictness of such a regulation.> While the Commission
believes that it is compelling to argue for gender equality under
a business case rationale, this weakens the legitimacy of the
directive because of the questionable results that past studies
have shown.274 The Commission would make their reasoning
more legitimate under social justifications that do not require
the level of proof that the business case rationale does.
Furthermore, while the directive will likely increase the
number of women on corporate boards, this won't necessarily
solve all of the gender divisions in the entire workforce. The
Commission should study the barriers for women climbing the
corporate ladder and address those issues as well.
272. See Branson, supra note 92, at 13 (noting the success of the mentoring
program in Australia); see also Teresa Ooi, Women Groomed In Art of Smashing Glass
Ceilings, AUSTRALTAN Jan. 25, 2011), available at http:,// wy.theaiistralian.com.au/
business/women-grooied-in-art-of-siashing -glass-ceilings/stoly-c6frg 8zx-
1225993879008 (reporting on the launch of the mentorship program in Australia).
273. See notes 257-61 (discussing the strong critique against implementing a
quota).
274. See supra notes 96-105 (describing studies that have show diversity does not
necessarily improve firm performance).
